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Abstract 
      This paper reviews Japan's experiences with the liberalization of capital accounts, and tries 
to identify their implications to China. 
      Liberalization of capital accounts proceeded very gradually in Japan from the adoption of a 
system of general prohibition of foreign exchange and capital transactions in 1949 through the 
shift to a generally liberalized system in 1979. Meantime, Japan was exposed to the turbulent 
international financial markets due to the move from a peg to a float system of its currency and 
two oil crises. In response to the massive short-term capital flow in and out of the country 
caused by these shocks, Japan, which was generally headed for the liberalization of the capital 
accounts, was frequently forced to resort to foreign exchange and capital control measures to 
stabilize the market. 
   These experiences by Japan seems to give valuable implications to China, for which 
significant enhancement of the flexibility of its exchange rate movement under the recently 
revised formal exchange rate regime and the liberalization of capital accounts continue to be 
important policy agenda in the years to come. 
 
   
 
I.  Introduction 
 
      This paper reviews Japan's experiences with the liberalization of capital account 
transactions, and tries to identify their implications to China
1. 
                                                                            
1    This paper is based on a paper presented to a joint workshop held by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS) and Policy Research Institute (PRI) of Japan’s Ministry of Finance on May 21, 2004 in 
Beijing. The author is thankful to the comments given to the early version of the paper from MR. Kenji 
Matsuyama, Mr. Yasuto Suzuki, Mr. Yoshimochi Kuwata, and Mr. Hajimu Yamashita and also to the 
assistance extended by the PRI, particularly by Mr. Tomoyuki Ota, and the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation Institute (JBICI), to which the author then belonged. The views expressed in this paper are 
solely those of the author’s, and do not reflect the views of any organization to which he belonged in the 
past.   178  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
While the countries that were most severely affected by the Asian currency crisis had relatively 
liberal capital accounts, those with strictly regulated capital accounts, such as China and 
Vietnam, managed to escape direct impacts of the crisis. In view of this fact, it was argued that 
hasty liberalization of capital accounts might have played an important role in the outbreak of 
the crisis. And through subsequent examinations of this issue, the international community 
gradually formulated a consensus that rapid and unprepared liberalization of capital accounts 
carries a great risk, and that appropriate sequencing of liberalization is of vital importance. 
However, views have not converged yet, as to specifically in what steps a country, particularly a 
developing country, should proceed with the liberalization of capital accounts. 
   Until quite recently, China had maintained an exchange rate regime of de-facto peg to the 
US dollar under the strictly regulated capital accounts. However, with the continued high 
economic growth coupled with a huge external surplus and an accumulation of large foreign 
reserves, it is widely argued that China should reform its exchange rate regime and enhance the 
flexibility of the RMB movements. Against this background, the Chinese government had been 
examining possible revisions to the regime and on July 21, 2005, it announced that China’s 
exchange rate regime would move to a managed floating system based on market supply and 
demand with reference to a basket of currencies under which the rate would be allowed to float 
within a band of 0.3 % (i.e., same as before) around the central parity to be announced daily by 
the People’s Bank of China and that the RMB rate vis-a-vis US dollar would be adjusted to 8.11 
RMB per dollar (i.e., about 2% revaluation). However, the RMB exchange rate has shown very 
limited movements since then, and it appears that there is in practice little change to the de 
facto peg system of the RMB so far
2. On the other hand, on the capital account front, China had 
been partially relaxing its strict capital account regulations so as to alleviate the upward 
pressure on its currency and contain the sharp increase in its foreign reserves, and gradually 
putting into practice such reforms that would allow enhanced inward and outward cross 
boarder capital flows including portfolio securities investment. However, prior to the recent 
revision to the exchange rate regime, regulations on external borrowings by foreign owned 
enterprise was tightened as from April 2005
3, showing a policy development opposite to the 
relaxation oriented general policy stance in the previous years. This particular development may 
have been due to concerns about possible impacts on short-term capital flows of the revision of 
exchange rate regime under consideration at that time under the persistent expectation for the 
RMB revaluation in the market. But this episode suggests that, while it seems unlikely that 
China has already developed a grand design on how to proceed with the liberalization of capital 
                                                                            
2  It is rather difficult to foresee how the RMB exchange rate will move in the periods to come as the rate 
developments will be crucially dependent on how the Chinese government will administer the new 
system, taking into account such factors as cross border capital flows under the new regime, domestic 
economic developments and internal and external economic and political environments. In essence, that 
is a political decision.   
3  It is reported in the media that the Chinese government is examining some relaxation of the tightened 
regulation enforced from April 2005 (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, September 2, 2005)   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 179 
accounts as a whole, it is quite possible that China’s path for capital account liberalization in 
the coming years may be accompanied by frequent policy reversals, reflecting the developments 
in economic and political environments over time.   
      Against such background, this paper aims to identify relevant implications for China so as to 
help it to cope with this complex issue as smoothly as possible, by reviewing the process Japan 
followed in the liberalization of its capital accounts, with a focus on the period from the 1960s, 
when Japan started substantively liberalizing its foreign exchange management and capital 
controls, to the 1970s, when the yen moved from a peg system to a float system following the 
so-called "Nixon Shock." 
      The paper is structured as follows. Chapter 1, as an introductory part of the paper, reiterates 
the lessons learned from the Asian crisis, and briefly explains some important findings by the 
studies conducted by the IMF on the liberalization of capital accounts. Chapter 2 describes 
Japan's experiences mainly in the 1960s and 1970s in three parts; first, the treatment of capital 
accounts in the sequencing of liberalization of Japan’s economy as a whole; second, the order of 
liberalization of capital accounts by type of capital transaction; and third, use of 
foreign-exchange management and capital control measures to regulate short-term capital flows 
during the period of instability in international financial market. Lastly, Chapter 3 discusses 
China’s current capital account regulations and the implications of Japan's experiences to 
China. 
 
II.  The Lessons Learned from the Asian Crisis, and Some Findings by the 
Studies Conducted by the IMF on the Liberalization of Capital Accounts 
 
II.1.    Lessons from the Asian Crisis Regarding Capital Account Liberalization 
 
   Among the most important lessons learned from the Asian crisis is the huge risk posed by 
unstable movements of short-term capital. Figure 1 shows the relationship between two figures 
for 10 Asian economies, including 5 crisis-hit economies. The first figure on the horizontal axis 
is the ratio of short-term debt to international reserves as of 1996, and the second figure on the 
vertical axis is the rate of currency depreciation in one year period from end-June 1997 to 
end-June 1998. It is clearly shown that there is a negative relationship between these two 
figures, that is, the greater a country's short-term debt relative to its international reserves, the 
more severely the currency depreciated, indicating the risk of short-term debt
4.  
                                                                            
4 Under one new line of argument on the mechanisms of currency crises, called the "balance sheet 
approach", a country’s resilience to various shocks, including financial ones, is considered to depend 
greatly on the structure of its assets and liabilities, particularly on the structure of foreign liquid assets 
and liabilities of the country (or that of each of its sectors, including the financial, public, and corporate 
sectors) . The line of thoughts that treats the ratio of short-term debt to foreign reserves as a proxy 
indicator of vulnerability to external shocks shares a common understanding of the cause of the crisis 
with the balance-sheet approach. 180  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
     Since the outbreak of the Asian crisis, Japanese government pointed out the important role 
played by the instability of short-term capital flows and insisted that hasty liberalization of 
capital accounts should be avoided and that capital controls may be required under the crisis 
situation. Initially, there was not much international support for this view, but through a series 
of turmoil in the international markets which followed the Asian crisis including the Russian 
crisis in the summer of 1998, the near-collapse of a major US-based hedge fund, called the 
Long-term Capital Management, and a massive capital outflow from Latin America, the view 
gradually gained wider international supports. In June 1999, the G7 Finance Ministers' meeting 
agreed on a report entitled "Strengthening the International Financial Architecture." The report 
stated that huge risk is involved in excessive debts, particularly foreign currency denominated 
debts; that it is necessary to proceed with the liberalization of capital accounts carefully and in 
an orderly manner; that controls on capital inflow may be justified in a transitory period until 
the domestic financial system is strengthened; and that control on capital outflow may be 
justified under exceptional circumstances. These are substantially different from the previously 
internationally dominant view which supported free movements of capital. 
 
Figure 1    Short-term Debt / International Reserves and Currency Depreciation 
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Note)  Short-Term debt for Vietnam excludes interests arrears 
Souce)   World Bank "Global Development Finance " , ADB "Key Indicators 2001" 
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II.2.    Studies by the IMF 
 
     The IMF and the US, which strongly supported the IMF, insisted that the Asian crisis was 
caused by structural problems in the crisis countries including vulnerable financial sectors and 
argued that structural reform was essential for overcoming the crisis. As the crisis spred and 
deepened and criticism of the IMF’s prescriptions mounted, the IMF gradually changed its views 
and came to emphasize the role of overly hasty capital account liberalization in causing the 
crisis. This section first describes the IMF’s traditional stance toward capital account 
liberalization and its recent change and then explains major conclusions reached by recent 
research work in the IMF on the sequencing of capital account liberalization. 
 
II.2.1.    The IMF Articles of Agreement and Capital Account Liberalization 
 
      The IMF Articles of Agreement generally prohibit member countries from placing 
restrictions on payments for trade and other current transactions, but this prohibition does not 
apply to transactions whose purpose is the movement of capital. Article 6, Para. 3 of the IMF 
Articles of Agreement states: "Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate 
international capital movements…"   
      Under such basic framework, the IMF did not (and could not) formally promote 
liberalization of capital accounts through such actions as indicating members a general guidance 
on the liberalization of capital accounts, but it rather took a reserved approach to express its 
views on a case by case basis, on such occasions as Article 4 consultations. Furthermore, as for 
the developed countries, not the IMF but the OECD through its capital liberalization code acted 
as a driving force for the liberalization of capital accounts. With regard to developing countries, 
however, although it is claimed that the IMF took such a case-by-case approach, the IMF 
appears to have basically taken a positive attitude toward liberalization of capital accounts by 
welcoming measures by developing countries to liberalize regulations on capital accounts and 
discouraging strengthened regulations. For example, some IMF occasional papers point out that 
the IMF regarded a combination of fiscal, financial, and exchange-rate measures as an 
appropriate response to a massive inflow of capital, and generally discouraged strengthening of 
regulations on the movement of capital, and that the IMF showed a general distaste for the 
re-introduction of capital controls to cope with balance of payments deterioration
5. 
 
                                                                            
5  See Age Bakker and Bryan Chapple, “Advanced Country Experiences with Capital Account 
Liberalization,” IMF Occasional Paper, 214 pp 1-2, and Peter J. Quirk, Owen Evans et al., “Capital 
Account Convertibility – Review of Experience and Implications for the IMF Policies” 1995, IMF 
Occasional Paper 131 pp.5-10, 22-26 182  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
II.2.2.    The Change in the IMF's Stance After the Asian Crisis 
 
   After entering the 1990s, with the proliferation of liberalized capital accounts even among 
developing countries and the globalization of financial markets, it came to be argued that the 
IMF should play a more formal role in the liberalization of capital accounts. In April 1997, the 
IMF Interim Committee agreed to revise the IMF Articles of Agreement and make the promotion 
of the liberalization of capital accounts a goal of the IMF, based on the understanding that the 
free movement of capital would benefit the world economy. However, in the midst of the Asian 
crisis, which broke out immediately after this agreement, a more cautious view on the risk of the 
liberalization of capital accounts gradually obtained a wider supports, and the momentum for 
the revision of the Articles was lost at least for the time being.   
   After the G7 Finance Ministers meeting report of June 1999 mentioned previously was 
published, the IMF itself gradually shifted its stance on the liberalization of capital accounts 
towards a more cautious one. The IMF's new line of argument is that, while keeping intact the 
previous basic stance that the liberalization of capital accounts has great benefits, it admits that 
it is necessary to carefully manage and sequence the liberalization process in order to minimize 
concomitant risks. The IMF’s role in this regard is to clarify and help prepare the necessary 
conditions for the liberalization of capital accounts. From this viewpoint, the IMF started to 
encourage countries to upgrade policy and institutions through dissemination of internationally 
recognized standards and codes relating to various fields including the financial sector, so as to 
prevent crises
6 At the same time, it has made efforts to understand the issues involved in the 
liberalization of capital accounts by reviewing the experiences of its members with the use and 
liberalization of capital controls. In particular, in response to the instruction in May 2000 by 
then Managing Director Horst Köhler to his staff to come up with practical advice relating to 
the sequencing of capital accounts liberalization, and the similar request by the International 
Monetary and Financial Committee (previously the Interim Committee), the IMF undertook 
studies of mode of orderly liberalization of capital accounts. 
 
II.2.3.    IMF Papers Relating to the Sequencing of the Liberalization of Capital accounts 
 
      The IMF has not so far indicated its formal view on the practical guidance for sequencing 
of capital account liberalization, but among the papers published to date, what appears 
to be most relevant is the one entitled “Capital Account Liberalization and Financial Sector   
                                                                            
6  The IMF claims that the main lesson learned from the recent crises is that the core task of the IMF is 
crisis prevention. It is currently trying to promote the "Financial Sector Assessment Program," which 
assesses the overall financial systems of its members and also the Reports on Observance of Standards 
and Codes program that promotes adoption of internationally recognized good practices. On the other 
hand, it is a problem that there has not been much progress in the study of crisis resolution.   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 183 
Stability”
7  published in 2002 based on a paper submitted to a seminar of the IMF directors. The 
paper presents the following observations on sequencing of capital account liberalization, based 
on the analysis of 9 countries' experiences
8: 
(1)  There is no unique approach to the sequencing and coordination of the liberalization of 
capital accounts with other policies. 
(2)  It is not possible to independently analyze capital-account liberalization and other 
policies, due to their complex and substantially uncertain interaction.   
(3)  Consequently, the design of an actual plan for sequencing must be based on a careful 
assessment of each country's circumstances and requires judgments.   
(4)  In most cases, a gradual approach may be required, but a gradual approach does not 
guarantee an orderly liberalization.   
(5)  If the macroeconomic situation of a country changes, or its vulnerability increases, the 
country must be prepared to change the sequencing plan.   
(6)  In some cases, it may be appropriate to adopt a contingency plan to delay further 
liberalization until the situation improves.   
(7)  Care is required when applying an approach that has been successful for one country to 
another country
9. 
   These observations are very much different form the frequently stated orthodox views that 
capital account liberalization contributes to a more efficient international allocation of capital 
and is thus beneficial to the world economy. This indicates that internal discussion of the issue 
within the IMF has shifted toward a more practical approach.   
      In relation to the topic of this paper, i.e., identification of implications to China from Japan’s 
experiences, the above observations indicate that, when interpreting a country's experiences, it 
is necessary to sufficiently understand the external environment, domestic economic situation, 
and policies and institutions of that country, and carefully assess their applicability to other 
country. Keeping this in mind, the following Chapter reviews the process of Japan's 
liberalization, while briefly looking at environments at respective points in time. 
 
                                                                            
7 A Staff Team led by Shogo Ishii and Karl Habermeier, “Capital Account Liberalization and Financial 
Sector Stability” 2002, IMF Occasional Paper 211. Note that an Occasional Paper generally reflects the 
views of its authors, and does not necessarily reflect those of the IMF. Nevertheless, this paper was 
written by staff in a section assigned to follow the current state of regulations on capital accounts of 
member countries, and as mentioned above, was based on a paper presented to an IMF directors' seminar. 
Thus, it is likely that work experiences at the IMF and the way of thoughts of IMF staff are reflected in 
the paper.   
8  The "nine countries" are four countries that have liberalized their capital accounts without financial 
crises (Australia, Hungary, South Africa, and the United Kingdom), and five countries that experienced 
financial or external crises (South Korea, Mexico, Sweden, Turkey, and Paraguay). 
9  The paper also argues that the liberalization of capital accounts has both positive and negative impact 
on the stability of the financial system (p7); that a large inflow of capital increases domestic demand, 
expanding the current account deficit, and often causing a steep rise in domestic bank loans (p8); and 
that after capital-account liberalization, it is possible for asset prices to deviate from their equilibrium 
price (p9). 184  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
III.  Japan's  Experiences 
 
     This Chapter summarizes the sequencing of Japan's capital-account liberalization after the 
war, and identify its characteristics.   
   This Chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 describes the sequential treatment of the 
liberalization of capital accounts in the liberalization of Japan’s economy as a whole. Part 2 
describes sequencing of capital account liberalization by type of capital transactions. Part 3 
does not address the issue of sequencing itself but rather describes the way how Japan used 
foreign exchange management and capital control measures to respond to the massive 
short-term capital flow in the late 1960s and the 1970s, amidst the confusion in the international 
financial markets due to the so-called Nixon Shock, the subsequent switch to the float system 
and the oil shocks. This part provides important lessons on the relationship between sequencing 
of liberalization by type of transactions and the concomitant risks and on the way how measures 
should be applied to cope with such risks. 
 
III.1.    The Sequence of Capital Account Liberalization in the Liberalization 
of the Economy as a Whole (Figure 2, Table 1) 
 
III.1.1.  Overview 
 
     First, let us examine the treatment of capital-account liberalization in the liberalization of 
the economy as a whole. Table 1 shows the sequencing of liberalization in three main areas: trade 
(imports), capital transactions, and finance. In the period immediately after the end of the war, 
Japan regulated each of these areas very strictly, but subsequently Japan liberalized imports, 
then capital transactions and finally financial sector. More specifically, (1)Japan first 
substantially liberalized imports from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, especially from the early 
to mid-1960s. The trade balance was basically in deficits up to mid-1960s. (2)It then liberalized 
regulations on foreign exchange and capital transactions from the early 1960s to the late 1990s, 
especially during the period from the mid 1960s to the late 1970s. This period is characterized by 
unstable international financial markets. The trade balance started to frequently register surplus 
from mid-1960S and the yen was revalued and then appreciated after switching to a float system 
following a large increase in trade surplus in the early 1970’s. After that, however, the trade 
balance deteriorated and the yen depreciated in the first oil shock and then again in the second 
oil shock. (3)Then finally, it liberalized financial sector from the late 1970s to the 1990s. In this 
period, the trade balance constantly recorded a large surplus and the yen followed an upward 
trend until mid-1990’s. These processes are described in detail below.   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 185 
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Table 1    Sequencing of Japan's Economic Liberalization 
Time Period  Trade liberalization  Liberalization of foreign exchange and capital 
account transactions  Liberalization of finance  Remarks 
1940s (after 
the war) 
Complete management of trade by government (nation-managed trade) 
(Dec. 1945) 
 
Enactment of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Management Law 
(promulgated Dec. 1949, implemented 1950) (Comprehensive 
management of both foreign exchange and trade) 
 
(1)  Adoption of principle of liberalized exports, change from system of 
government imports to private imports under approval system; and 
adoption of foreign-currency budget system for imports (restrictions 
on amounts of imports and items that can be imported). 
 
(2)  Principle of general prohibition on foreign exchange and capital 
transactions with freedom as exceptions   
 
(3)  Adoption of foreign currency concentration system 
 
(4)  Use of authorized foreign-exchange banks as mechanism for 




Establishment of single 
exchange rate ($1 = ¥360) 
(Apr. 1949) 
1950s    Enactment of the Law Concerning Foreign 
Capital (May 1950) (promotion of 
introduction of high-quality, long-term 
foreign capital) 
 
Establishment of uniform "standard methods 
of payment" (payment methods for which no 







convertibility of European 
currencies (end-1958) 
1960s  Cabinet adopts “Basic 
Plan for Liberalization of 
Trade and Foreign 
Exchange” (Jun. 1960) 
(aimed at raising import 
liberalization rate (40% as 
of Apr. 1960) to roughly 
80% within 3 years 
(roughly 90%, if 
petroleum and coal are 
liberalized)) 
 
Same as left (Jun. 1960) (As for foreign 
exchange, liberalization of current account 
transactions within two years, and on capital 
accounts “gradually ease regulations, while 
paying attention not to cause negative impact 
on the development of domestic economy) 
 
Liberalization of use of yen for external 
payments (Jul. 1960) 
 
Introduction of non-resident free yen 





















































Time Period  Trade liberalization  Liberalization of foreign exchange and capital 
account transactions  Liberalization of finance  Remarks 
Note: The "import 
liberalization rate" is the 
ratio of the amount of 
imports as of 1959 of those 
items that have been 
liberalized (meaning 
removal of quantitative 
restriction on imports) to 
the total amount of 
imports in 1959 
 
Liberalization rate of 93% 
achieved (Apr. 1964) 
(level of Western 
countries reached) 
Permission of short-term foreign-currency 
borrowings from authorized foreign exchange 
banks by private enterprises on case-by-case 
examination basis (Nov. 1960) 
 
First issuance in the US of foreign currency 
denominated bond by private enterprise after 
the war (1961) 
 
Overseas issuance of stocks (in the form of 
DR) by private enterprises started (1961) 
 
Japan moves to IMF Article 8 status (Apr. 
1964) 
 
Abolishment of foreign-currency budget 
(Apr. 1964) 
 
Establishment of non-resident special 
accounts for securities with major securities 
companies, in order to facilitate investment 
in securities by non-residents (starting May 
1964) 
 
“First foreign capital liberalization package” 
(Jun. 1967) (start of major liberalization of 
inward foreign direct investment. Automatic 
authorization for up to 50% holdings for 33 
industries (category 1), and up to 100% for 17 
industries (category 2)) 
 
Easing of regulations on portfolio investment 
in Japanese stocks (Jul. 1967) (The upper 
limit on combined holdings by non-resident 
investors as a whole under automatic 
approval for stock acquisition raised from 
10% to 15% for restricted industries, and from 
15% to 20% for non-restricted industries, and 
the limit per investor raised from 5% to 7%. 
Subsequently, the limits were again raised in 













Japan becomes a member 
of Organization for 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) 
(Apr. 1964) 
 
Japan makes reservations 















































Time Period  Trade liberalization  Liberalization of foreign exchange and capital 
account transactions  Liberalization of finance  Remarks 
investment in stocks was in principle 
liberalized up to 100% (however, this is only 
when there was an agreement by the issuing 
company)) 
 
Introduction of restrictions on conversion to 
yen (“yen conversion limit”), (Feb. 1968) 
(restrictions on conversion into yen of foreign 
currency by authorized foreign exchange 
banks obtained through overseas borrowings 
or the like) 
 
“Second foreign capital liberalization 
package” (Mar. 1969) (Category 1 increased 
from 33 to 160 industries, and category 2 from 
17 to 44) 
 
Start of liberalization of outward foreign 
direct investment (Oct. 1969) (In Jun. 1972, 
outward foreign direct investment was in 
principle liberalized) 
1970s  Import liberalization rate 





Start of liberalization of outward portfolio 
investment in securities (Apr. 1970) (Totally 
banned prior to this measure. In Apr. 1970, 
the inclusion of foreign securities in security 
investment trusts was authorized, and 
subsequently, the purchase of foreign 
securities by institutional investors and 
general investors (via securities companies) 
was gradually liberalized through the mid 
1970s) 
 
“Third foreign capital liberalization package” 
(Sep. 1970) (Category 1 from 160 to 447 
(including banking and insurance industries), 
and category 2 from 44 to 77) 
 
Start of issuance in Japan of 
yen-denominated foreign bond by 























Turmoil with European 
currencies, and float of 
West German and Dutch 
currencies (May 1971) 
 
"Nixon Shock" (15 Aug. 
1971) 
 
UK, Italy, Nordic 
countries, Switzerland 
and others float their 
currencies (Aug. 1971) 
 
Yen tentatively moves to 
float (27 Aug. 1971) 
 
Smithsonian Agreement 
(18 Dec. 1971); $1 set to 
¥308 (19 Dec. 1971) (band 
expanded to ±2.25% (i.e., 









































Time Period  Trade liberalization  Liberalization of foreign exchange and capital 
account transactions  Liberalization of finance  Remarks 
Foreign capital liberalization for automobile 
industry (automobile industry included in 
category 1) (Apr. 1971)   
 
“Fourth foreign capital liberalization 
package” (Aug. 1971) (category 1 changed to 
negative list (7 industries made subject to 
case by case examination), category 2 from 77 
to 228) 
 
Abolishment of foreign currency 
concentration system (May 1972) 
 
“Fifth foreign capital liberalization package” 
(May 1973) (100% liberalization with 
exception of five industries, including 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and retail)
 
Liberalization of retail industry (Jun. 1975) 
(100% liberalization excluding 4 exception 
industries. Completion of liberalization of 
inward foreign direct investment) 
 
Some liberalization and simplification of 
capital account transactions (Jun. 1977 & Jan. 
1978) 
 
Comprehensive revision of Foreign Exchange 
and Foreign Trade Management Law 
(promulgated Dec. 1979, implemented Dec. 
1980) 
 
(1)  Shift to the principle of general 
liberalization of capital account 
transactions (prior notification system) 
(e.g. external borrowings, and inward 
and outward portfolio securities 
investment placed under prior 
notification system) 
 
(2)  Minister of Finance can introduce 











































Resurgence of European 
currency crisis (Jan. 1973)
 
Yen floated (14 Feb. 1973)
 
All major currencies 
floated against US dollar 
(Feb.-Mar. 1973) 
 
























































Time Period  Trade liberalization  Liberalization of foreign exchange and capital 
account transactions  Liberalization of finance  Remarks 
account transactions in cases where the 
transaction in question could cause large 
movements of capital, a sudden and 
violent change in the exchange rates, or 
the like. (emergency measures) 
 
(3)  For certain notified capital account 
transactions, if the transaction would 
have adverse impact on Japan's financial 
markets or the like, the Minister of 
Finance can recommend or order the 
capital account transactions to be 
modified or canceled (this applies to 
overseas lending, cross-boarder issuance 
of securities domestically and abroad, 




















Introduction of CDs (with liberalized 
interest rate) (May 1979) (start of 
deposit interest rate liberalization) 
1980s    Elimination of actual demand rule relating to 
forward exchange transactions (Apr. 1984) 
 
Elimination of yen conversion limit (Jun. 
1984) 
Issuance of euro-yen bonds by 
non-residents (Dec. 1984) (thereafter, 
euro-yen transactions gradually 
liberalized) 
 
Introduction of Money Market 
Certificates (MMC) (Mar. 1985) 
 
Yen-denominated BA market 
established (Sep. 1985) 
 
Liberalization of interest rates for 
large time deposits (Oct. 1985) 
 
Tokyo offshore market established 
(Dec. 1986) 
 












Yen dollar committee 
report (May 1984) 
 









































Time Period  Trade liberalization  Liberalization of foreign exchange and capital 
account transactions  Liberalization of finance  Remarks 
1990s 
 (And  later) 
  Revision of Foreign Exchange Law 
(promulgated May 1997, implemented Apr. 
1998) 
 
(1)  Authorization/prior notification 
requirements for capital account 
transactions in principle eliminated. 
Changed to after-the-fact report system 
(the word "Management" removed from 
the title of the law) 
 
(2)  Liberalization of foreign exchange 
business (abolishment of authorized 
foreign exchange bank system. 
Substantial reduction in the foreign 
exchange management function of 
banks) 
 
(3)  Conditions instituted for introduction of 
approval requirements by Minister of 
Finance, so as to achieve flexible 
implementation of economic sanctions 
and the like.   
 
(4)  Introduction of reporting obligation 
 
Establishment of Law Relating to the 
Reform of the Financial System (Jun. 
1992) (enables banks, securities firms, 
and trust banks to enter each other's 
businesses through establishment of 
subsidiaries)  
 
Complete liberalization of interest 
rates for time deposits (Jun. 1993) 
 
Liberalization of interest rates for 
liquid deposits (Oct. 1994)   
 
(completion of liberalization of 
interest rate (with exception of 
current deposits (interest 
prohibited)))  
 
Ordinary banks and others able to 
accept mid to long-term deposits of 
five years duration (Oct. 1994) 
 
Ordinary banks allowed to issue 
bonds (Oct. 1999) (abolishment of 
separation system between long-term 
and short-term financial institutions)
 
Elimination of restrictions on 
business by securities subsidiaries 
established by banks and others, and 
trust subsidiaries established by 
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III.1.2.  Trade  Liberalization 
 
   After the end of World War II, Japan was under the control of the General Headquarters 
(GHQ)of allied forces. Based on America's "Initial Policy Relating to Japan" (September 22, 
1945) and other relevant policies, Japanese residents were in principle entirely prohibited from 
conducting external economic transactions including imports and exports and foreign 
exchange transactions, immediately after the end of the war. These activities were only allowed 
under the authorization of the Japanese government, which was given with the prior approval 
of the GHQ
10. However, as there was an urgent need to import materials for Japan's economic 
reconstruction, including materials needed to combat hunger right after the war, exports were 
needed in order to pay for these imports. Thus in December 1945, the Japanese government 
established with the approval by the GHQ, the Trade Agency as an organization for the 
centralized management of Japanese trade, and started the nation-managed trade
11. Starting in 
August 1947 private-sector exports were gradually resumed (at the time, however, all imports 
were still being conducted by the government). Then with the start of the cold war, the US 
policy toward Japan changed, and the US adopted a policy of encouraging a rapid return of 
Japan to the international economy and its economic self-dependence through trade. Under 
this policy, in 1949 a single exchange rate of 360 yen to the US dollar was established (April 
1949), and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Management Law (the "Foreign Exchange 
Law" hereafter) was enacted (promulgated December 1949), which was aimed at fostering 
sound private-sector trade. The Foreign Exchange Law comprehensively managed both foreign 
exchange and trade, and in the area of trade, the following principles were adopted in 
accordance with the law and related regulations including cabinet and ministerial ordinances: 
(1) the principle of freedom of exports was employed to a great degree, relaxing the 
across-the-board prior approval system for all exports. But at the same time, (2) the system of 
import moved from the system of the government-conducted imports to the privately conducted 
imports under an approval system, and (3) a foreign-exchange budget system (regulating the 
amounts and items that could be imported)
12 was adopted in order to make effective use of 
                                                                            
10  Ministry of Finance, Office of History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies Ed., "Showa Zaiseishi (History of 
Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Japan's Showa Era – From the End of World War II to Pacification – 15. 
International Finance and Trade," 1976, Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha Inc., pp 3-5. The rest of this section is 
based largely on this source. 
11  Foreign exchange transactions relating to trade were handled by foreign banks set up in Japan with the 
approval of the GHQ, and the GHQ directly controlled all foreign currency. 
12  Under the foreign exchange budget system, the ministerial council (head: Prime Minister) established at 
the cabinet based on the article 3 of the Foreign Exchange Law, formulated, for every pre-determined 
period (quarterly from January 1952 to March 1952, and half-yearly from April 1952 to March 1964), a 
budget which sets a ceiling on the maximum amount to be approved of the payment of foreign exchange 
on a currency-by-currency basis for each item or category of imports. The government agencies were 
prohibited from giving approval to the use of foreign exchange under their jurisdiction in an amount in 
excess of such ceiling, unless authorization by ministerial council was obtained. Such foreign exchange 
budget system was in operation for 14 years and 3 months from January 1952 and was abolished by March 
31, 1964, on Japan’s transition to the IMF article 8 status on April 1, 1964. (Ministry of Finance, Office of 




      From 1950, Japan returned to the international economy under these basic systems of regulation. 
Japan's economic performance, however, was lackluster. Throughout the 1950s, Japan usually had a 
large trade deficit (the current account balance fluctuated greatly due to foreign assistance and other 
factors), and from 1953-1954 and in 1957, rapid decrease in foreign reserves forced the government to 
adopt a tightening policy (it was said that a ceiling was imposed on domestic economy by the weak 
balance of payments position), and take loans from the IMF and others. In light of Japan's vulnerable 
balance of payments position, imports were extensively regulated throughout the 1950s (quantitative 
restrictions). Japan's import liberalization rate
14  was 22% in 1956, and was just 33% in 1958. 
     The major liberalization of trade and foreign exchange began in the 1960s. The background 
to these actions was the restoration of convertibility of European currencies (which made Japan 
become fearful of being left behind in the world economic growth), Japan's improved external 
position, including a positive trade balance in 1958 and 1959 due to a surge in exports, and 
demand on Japan from the United States for liberalization at GATT. On 24 June 1960, the 
government approved the Basic Plan for Liberalization of Trade and Foreign Exchange, making 
clear its commitment to actively liberalize trade and foreign exchange. The plan called for an 
increase in the import liberalization rate from 40% in April 1960, to about 80% within three 
years
15. The liberalization plan was accomplished ahead of schedule, and by the time of 
transition to an IMF "Article 8" country in April 1964, Japan’s import liberalization rate had 
reached the level of Western countries
16.  
   To summarize, although the liberalization of trade (imports) proceeded gradually after the 
war, major steps were started in 1960 with the government plan, and by the mid 1960s trade 
liberalization had reached a par with the Western countries. 
                                                                            
13  The system of regulations under the Foreign Exchange Law and related ordinances and statutes employs 
several key principles relating to the control of foreign exchange. In addition to the foreign-exchange 
budget system, it includes a general ban on foreign exchange and capital transactions; the adoption of 
concentration system of foreign currency; and use of foreign-exchange banks as an instrument for 
controlling foreign exchange. These points are discussed in the next section.   
14 The import liberalization rate is the ratio of the amount of imports of liberalized goods (i.e., goods 
exempt from quantitative restrictions on import) in 1959 to the amount of total imports in 1959, 
excluding materials imported by the government. 
15  Although the liberalization of trade and foreign exchange was led by the government, these efforts had 
the active support of the private sector, from the standpoint of improving their own efficiency (Ministry 
of Finance, Office of History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies Ed. (1976) p37).   
16 At the time, however, some 136 goods were still subject to import restrictions, including agricultural, 
forestry, and fisheries products, as well such as key industrial products as passenger cars, machine tools, 
power generators, computers, and the like. After that, import liberalization took a further step forward. 
In October 1965, passenger cars were liberalized; in April 1970, machine tools and power generators were 
liberalized; and in June 1971, automobile engines were liberalized. In this way, by April 1972, a 
liberalization rate of 95% was achieved, and the number of goods with import restrictions was reduced 
to 33 (24 agriculture, forestry and fisheries products, and 9 machine-tool products). (KOHAMA Hirohisa 
and WATANABE Machiko, " Sengo Nihon Keizai no 50-nen (Japan’s Postwar Economic Development – 
From a developing Country to a Developed Country)," 1996, Nippon Hyoron-sha, pp 156-160). Note that 
the import of integrated circuits (ICs) was liberalized for ICs having fewer than 200 components in 
April 1973, and for those having 200 or more components in December 1974. Similarly, the import of 
electronic calculating devices and their components was liberalized in December 1975 (Ibid. p 158).   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 195 
 
III.1.3.    Liberalization of Foreign Exchange and Capital Account Transactions 
 
      After the end of the war, the aforementioned Foreign Exchange Law (promulgated December 
1949), the Law Concerning Foreign Capital (the "Foreign Capital Law") (promulgated May 1950), 
which is a law containing special measures relating to the Foreign Exchange Law, and related 
ministerial ordinances and other forms of regulations, regulated foreign exchange and capital 
account transactions. The main features of this regulatory system relating to foreign exchange 
and capital account transactions were: (1) the use of a foreign-currency budget system relating 
to imports was adopted as mentioned above, (2) a principle of general prohibition with 
liberalization for exceptions regarding foreign exchange and capital account transactions was 
adopted,; (3) the government centrally controlled all foreign currency (in 1952, there was a move 
to a system whereby authorized foreign exchange banks and certain other entities could retain a 
certain amount of foreign currency); (4) authorized foreign exchange banks were used as a 
mechanism for controlling foreign-exchange and capital account transactions; and (5) from the 
perspective of securing an inflow of cash from exports, and preventing the capital flight
17, the 
government adopted the standard method of payment for making and collecting payments 
abroad (stipulating standardized payment periods, currency, payment conditions, etc.); so long 
as payments are to be made in accordance with this standard method there was no need to 
obtain approval from the government.   
     Meanwhile, the Foreign Capital Law only authorized the inflow of long-term, high-quality 
foreign capital that would contribute to the self-dependence of the Japanese economy, its sound 
growth, and the improvement of the balance of payments. The law guaranteed, for the 
authorized foreign capital, overseas transfers of both profits and the invested capital that was 
recovered. 
18 
      As the next section describes in detail the liberalization of capital accounts, broken down by 
type of transaction, the present section only touches upon the major developments in the 
liberalization. The substantive liberalization of capital accounts began in the 1960s, more 
specifically by the aforementioned Basic Plan for Liberalization of Trade and Foreign Exchange 
(June 1960), which called for the general liberalization of current-account foreign exchange 
transactions within two years. The plan, however, showed a cautious stance on capital account 
transactions stating: "Regulations shall be eased gradually, while taking care so as not to give 
                                                                            
17 Ministry of Finance, Office of History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies (1976), p 52 gives the following 
reasons for the creation of this system: prevention of the worsening of transaction terms (e.g. demand for 
up-front settlement for payments), and prevention of extreme fluctuations in foreign-currency reserves 
due to leads and lags.   
18  As for stocks, initially only dividend transfers were guaranteed and guarantees on transfers of recovered 
principle were started in July 1957, under certain conditions. "Guaranteed" here means that the required 
amount of foreign exchange is registered in the foreign-currency budget and there is no need to obtain 
authorization for transfers. 196  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
adverse impact on domestic economic development "
19 and thus did not specify contents or 
timing of liberalization. The main subsequent liberalization measures include general 
liberalization of current account foreign exchange transactions in April 1964, on Japan’s 
acceptance of IMF Article 8 status, and the abolishment of foreign-currency budget at the same 
time. Starting in the latter half of the 1960s, certain types of investment such as inward foreign 
direct investment and inward and outward portfolio securities investment were liberalized step 
by step. In May 1972, the centralized foreign-currency management system was abolished, and 
the possession of foreign currency by residents was liberalized. In December 1980, the Foreign 
Exchange Law was thoroughly revised, incorporating the Foreign Capital Law. Under the 
revised law, the regulatory principle for capital account transactions underwent a major change, 
from general prohibition to general liberalization, by, for example, shifting overseas borrowing 
and inward and outward portfolio securities investment from under the previous approval 
system to under the prior-reporting system. Then in May 1997, a number of drastic revisions 
were made by another revision of the Foreign Exchange Law, including the general abolishment 
of the system of authorization/prior reporting of capital account transactions and a shift to a 
system of after-the-fact reporting, as well as the liberalization of foreign-exchange business 
(abolishment of authorized foreign exchange bank system). In this way, all the main features of 
postwar foreign-exchange and capital controls mentioned earlier have been eliminated (or 
substantially modified in the case of the use of banks as a management instrument): the 
foreign-currency budget system (eliminated in 1964); the system of general prohibition on 
foreign exchange and capital account transactions (eliminated by 1980 revision); foreign 
currency concentration system (eliminated in 1972); and use of authorized foreign exchange 
banks as management instruments (the elimination of the authorized foreign exchange bank 
system in 1997 in effect greatly reduced the level of control through the banks). To summarize, 
the liberalization of foreign exchange and capital account transactions began in the early 1960s, 
and was pursued particularly actively from the mid-1960s through the 1970s, and the revisions 
to the law in 1980 significantly changed the way these were managed. 
 
III.1.4.  Liberalization  of  Finance 
 
      Japan's postwar financial system was characterized by regulations on deposit interest rates, 
and a specialized financial institution system. The liberalization of regulations on deposit 
                                                                            
19 At the beginning of the 1960s, the Ministry of Finance maintained a cautious posture with regard to 
capital account liberalization. In a testimony before the Diet in February 1962, then Minister of Finance 
SATO Eisaku stated that: (1) as for the order of liberalization, the current account should be liberalized 
first, followed by the liberalization of non-resident capital account transactions, then finally by the 
liberalization of resident capital account transactions; and (2) the effects of international capital 
account transactions would be long and deep and therefore care needs to be paid to their treatment 
(Ministry of Finance, Office of History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies Ed., "Showa Zaiseishi (History of 
Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Japan's Showa Era – From 1952 to 1973 – 12. International Finance and 
Foreign Relations (2)," 1992, Toyo Keizai Inc., p 127)   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 197 
 
interest rates began in 1979, with the introduction of CDs, which are a product with liberalized 
interest rates. Then after the introduction of Money Market Certificates (MMC), the interest 
rate of which changes with market interest rate, and the liberalization of interest on large time 
deposit in 1985, the liberalization of deposit interest was completed with the exception of 
current deposits, for which interest was prohibited, by the complete liberalization of time 
deposits in 1993 and the liberalization of interest on liquid deposits in 1994.   
   The system of specialized financial institutions was characterized by principles of division 
of labor/specialization such as the separation between banking and securities industries, and 
also between long-term and short-term financial institutions. However, the Law Relating to the 
Reform of the Financial System, which passed the Diet in 1992, enabled financial institutions to 
enter other sectors of financial business through the establishment of subsidiaries. Furthermore, 
in 1999 ordinary banks were authorized to obtain long-term financing through the issue of 
corporate bonds, which was previously permitted only to long-term credit banks and trust 
banks. With this reform, the separation of long and short-term financing vanished. In this way, 
the liberalization of finance began in the late 1970s, gained momentum in the 1980s, and 
continued into the 1990s. 
 
III.2.    The Sequencing of Capital Account Liberalization by Transaction Type (Table 1) 
 
   Next, let us examine the types of capital account transactions that were given priority in 
liberalization, and the types whose liberalization was delayed. As liberalization proceeded over 
a long period of time, via a complex process,
20  it is difficult to come to a clear conclusion. The 
following trends, however, are recognizable. 
 
                                                                            
20 According to INUDA Akira in "Japan's Postwar Foreign Exchange Management Policy and Easing of 
Regulations on Long-term and Short-term Capital Account Transactions: A 30-year Look Back from The 
General Prohibition of the 1949 Foreign Exchange Law to General Liberalization of the 1979 Revisions to 
the Foreign Exchange Law," 2000, Chuokoron Jigyo Shuppan, p 9, in the 30 years after the enactment of 
the Foreign Exchange Law and Foreign Capital Law, cabinet and ministerial ordinances and other 
regulations under these laws were revised over 100 times.   198  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
Figure 3    Japan: Short-term Capital Controls and Developments 
            in Exchange Rate and Balance of Payments, 1965-81 
 









































Source)  MOF "Balance of Payments" , IMF "International Financial Statistics" 
Note 1)  Sub-periods are characterized as below: 
  I: Switch to inflow restrictions around the Nixon shock (late 60s to around mid-71) 
  II: Easing of regulations after the Smithonian Accord and subsequent re-strengthening (end-71 
to around mid-73) 
  III: Change to inflow promotion after the 1st oil shock (end-73 to 74) 
  IV:  Easing of regulations under the relatively stable international financial market (75 to 
around mid-77) 
  V: Return to inflow restrictions under the yen appreciation (end-77 to 78) 
 VI:  Re-switching to inflow promotion under the yen depreciation (79 to 80) 
  2)  Trade balance in this figure is on the balance of payment basis and different from that in 










































Table 2 Japan's Regulations on Short-term Capital Flows in the Period of Significant Market Instability 
around the "Nixon Shock" and Oil Crises 
Regulations on authorized foreign exchange banks Time Period 




Inward and outward 
portfolio securities 
investment 
Borrowings of foreign 
currency by private 
enterprises and 
cross-border securities 
issuance by residents 
and non-residents 
Others 
1960s       
 Introduction  of 
non-resident free yen 
accounts (July 1960) 
Regulations on overall 
foreign exchange 
position covering both 
spot and forward (Sep. 
1960) 
Introduction of reserve 
requirement for foreign 
currency denominated 
liabilities including 




outstanding balance of 
external short-term 
debt (Euro money and 
free yen accounts) 
(July 1964) 
 Resident  enterprises 
start overseas issues of 
foreign-currency 
denominated bonds 





around end 1960s) 
 Introduction  of 
restrictions on 
conversion to yen (“yen 
conversion limit”) 
(Feb. 1968) (conversion 
of foreign-currency 
denominated assets to 
yen (i.e., over-sold 
position) limited to a 
specified level on a 
monthly average 
balance basis) 
 Complete  ban  on 
short-term impact 
loans (borrowings by 
companies in foreign 
currency with no 











































Regulations on authorized foreign exchange banks Time Period 




Inward and outward 
portfolio securities 
investment 
Borrowings of foreign 
currency by private 
enterprises and 
cross-border securities 
issuance by residents 
and non-residents 
Others 
1970       
  Yen  conversion  limit 
strengthened 
(conversion to yen 
limited to zero, in 
principle) (Feb.) 
   
1971       
 Introduction  of 
restrictions on 
outstanding balance of 
free yen accounts 
(Aug.) (The balance 
required to be no 
greater than balance as 
of 27 August) 
Request for voluntary 
restraint from 
extending overseas 




outstanding balance of 
foreign debt by banks 
(Aug.) (The balance 
required to be no 
greater than balance as 
of 18 August) 
Yen conversion limit 
strengthened (changed 
to daily balance basis) 
(Sep.) 
Legal basis given to yen 
conversion limit, 










Ban on acquisition of 




outstanding balance of 
non-resident special 
accounts for securities 
(i.e., a special yen 
account opened with 
securities companies 
for the purpose of 
securities investment 
by non-residents)  
(Sep.) 
Residents in principle 




Easing of restrictions on amount 
and time period that the private 
sector is allowed to hold foreign 
currency, and increase of 
maximum limit of foreign 
currency that ordinary overseas 
travelers are allowed to take out 
of the country (from $1,000 to 
$3,000) (May) 
Suspension of authorizing 
trading companies to extend 
guarantees to the borrowings by 
their overseas 
subsidiaries/branches (May) 
Regulations on acceptance of 
prepayments for exports 
(prepayments in excess of 
$10,000 requires authorization) 
(Aug.) 
(Easing of regulations 
following Smithsonian 
 Easing  of  yen 
conversion limit 









































Regulations on authorized foreign exchange banks Time Period 




Inward and outward 
portfolio securities 
investment 
Borrowings of foreign 
currency by private 
enterprises and 
cross-border securities 
issuance by residents 
and non-residents 
Others 
Accord (Dec. 1971 to 
Jan. 1972)) 
(return to monthly 
average balance basis) 
(Dec.) 
Abolishment of foreign 
debt balance 
restrictions (Dec.)   
Abolishment of 
restrictions on overseas 
local loans and 
guarantees (the one 
introduced in May) 
(Dec.) 













free-yen balance (the 
one introduced in Aug. 
1971) (Jan.) 
Reserve rate (25%) 
newly set for increased 
amount of free-yen 
account (June) 
Reserve rate raised to 
50% (July) 
Abolishment of 
restrictions on balance 
of external short-term 
debt (the one 
introduced in July 
1964) (Jan.) 
Yen conversion limit 
re-strengthened (from 
monthly average 
balance basis to daily 
balance basis) (May) 
Application of general 
reserve requirement 
system to foreign 
currency denominated 
debt (implementation 
was from June 1977) 
(Mar.) 
Abolishment of reserve 
requirement on foreign 
Abolishment of 
regulations on balance 
of non-resident special 
accounts for securities 
(the one introduced in 
Sep.) (Jan.) 
Introduction of yen 
conversion limit to 
non-resident special 
accounts for securities 
(June) 
Amount of stocks and 
bonds to be acquired 
by non-residents 
limited to respective 
amount of stocks and 
bonds that have been 
sold (zero net inflow) 
(Oct.) 
Abolishment of ban on 
  Abolishment of regulations on 
acceptance of export 
prepayments (the one introduced 
in August) (Jan.) 
Reintroduction of regulations on 
acceptance of prepayments for 
exports (those in excess of 
$10,000 requires authorization) 
(Feb.) 
Abolishment of foreign currency 
concentration system (May) 
Opening of foreign-currency 
deposit accounts by ordinary 
residents allowed (May) 
Opening of foreign-currency 
deposit accounts by 
non-residents allowed (May) 









































Regulations on authorized foreign exchange banks Time Period 




Inward and outward 
portfolio securities 
investment 
Borrowings of foreign 
currency by private 
enterprises and 
cross-border securities 





Change from blanket 
authorization of mid 
and long-term overseas 
local loans (longer than 
1 year) to case-by-case 
authorization (Oct.) 
acquisition of 
non-listed bonds by 
non-residents 
(excepting short-term 
bonds (1 year or 
shorter)) (Oct.) 
prepayments for exports 
strengthened (those in excess of 
$5,000 requires authorization) 
(June) 
Authorization required for 
charter contracts relating to 
exported used ships, etc. (Oct.)
Maximum authorization limit by 
authorized foreign exchange 
banks for overseas travel 
removed and purchases of 
foreign currency for travel of any 
amount made possible under 
authorization of authorized 
foreign exchange banks 
(authorization not required for 
amounts of $3,000/trip or less) 
(Nov.) 
1973       
(With the worsening of 
the balance of 
payments and outbreak 
of the first oil crisis, 
policies switched to 
encouraging inflows 
and containing 
outflows of capital 
(Nov. 1973 to Feb. 
1974) 
Reduction in reserve 
rate for increase in 
free-yen accounts 
(50% to 10%) (Dec.) 
Abolishment of yen 
conversion limit for 
free-yen accounts, 
with exception of 
main-office/branch 
accounts (Dec.) 
Easing of regulations 
on mid and long-term 
overseas local loans 
(Dec.) 
Restriction on 




(those with remaining 
duration to maturity of 






non-residents (the one 
introduced in Oct. 
Re-start of issuance by 
residents of "out-out" 
foreign bond (Dec.) 
Restrictive treatment 






Easing of restrictions on export 
prepayments (maximum amount 
exempt from authorization 
raised from $5,000 to $10,000) 
(Nov.) 
Curtailment of system of 
foreign-currency loan to 
residents (Dec., Jan.) 
Reintroduction of maximum 
authorization limit by 
authorized foreign exchange 
banks on foreign currency 
purchases for overseas travel 









































Regulations on authorized foreign exchange banks Time Period 




Inward and outward 
portfolio securities 
investment 
Borrowings of foreign 
currency by private 
enterprises and 
cross-border securities 
issuance by residents 
and non-residents 
Others 
1972) (Nov.-Dec.)  be approved by Bank of Japan) 
(Dec.) 
Maximum limit on small-sum 
wire transfers lowered ($3,000 
to $1,000) (Dec.) 






crisis” due to 
instability of Euro 
market in the summer 
of 1974, and the "Japan 
rate" problem) 
Elimination of reserve 
requirements for 




on short-term overseas 
local loans and 
prohibition in 
principle of mid to 
long-term overseas 
local loans (Jul.) 





securities, inclusive of 
those with remaining 
duration to maturity of 
longer than 6 months, 






non-listed bonds by 
non-residents (Aug.) 
Flexible introduction 
of impact loans (Jan.) 
Re-start of issuance by 
residents of “out-in” 
foreign bond (Nov.) 
Easing of restrictions on export 
prepayments (amount exempt 
from authorization raised from 
$10,000 to $100,000) (Jan.) 
Introduction of restrictions on 
outstanding balance of resident 
foreign currency deposit 
accounts (Feb.) 
Maximum limit for authorization 
by authorized foreign exchange 
banks for purchases of foreign 
currency for overseas travel 
lowered ($3,000 to $1,500) 
(Apr.) 
Maximum limit on small-sum 
wire transfers lowered ($1,000 to 
$200) (Apr.)   
Easing of restrictions on export 
prepayments (amount exempt 
from authorization raised from 
$100,000 to $500,000) (Jul.)   
Official borrowing of $ 1 billion 
by Japanese Government from 










































Regulations on authorized foreign exchange banks Time Period 




Inward and outward 
portfolio securities 
investment 
Borrowings of foreign 
currency by private 
enterprises and 
cross-border securities 
issuance by residents 
and non-residents 
Others 
1975       
(Easing of restrictions 
on capital outflows in 
response to increased 
capital inflows) 
 Permissible  limit  for 
short-term overseas 
local loans increased 
(Mar./Apr.) 
 Re-start of issuance of 
yen-denominated 




1976       
(Partial relaxation of 
foreign-exchange 
controls against a 
turning into surplus of 
balance of payments) 
  Partial relaxation of 
mid to long-term 
overseas local loans 
(not allowed in 
principle from Jul. 
1974) (up to the 
amount of reduction 
in loan 
balance)(Nov.) 
    Maximum limit on amount of 
foreign currency to take overseas 
on travel raised ($1,500 to 
$3,000) (Jun.)   
Maximum limit on small-amount 
wire transfers raised ($200 to 
$1,000) (Jun.) 
1977       
(Partial liberalization 
of capital account 




 Abolishment  of  yen 
conversion limit, and 
move to regulations on 
spot position 
(Over-sold spot 
position prohibited on 
daily balance basis. 
Main office-branch 
free-yen balance 
subtracted from spot 
foreign-currency 
assets) (Jun.) 
0.25% reserve rate set 
for foreign debt and 
free-yen deposit 
balance (Jun.) 
Easing of restrictions 




by residents (Jun.) 
  Abolishment of restrictions on 
balance of non-resident foreign 









































Regulations on authorized foreign exchange banks Time Period 




Inward and outward 
portfolio securities 
investment 
Borrowings of foreign 
currency by private 
enterprises and 
cross-border securities 
issuance by residents 
and non-residents 
Others 
Elimination of ceiling 
regulations on 
short-term local 
overseas loans (May) 
Easing of regulations 
on mid to long-term 
overseas local loans 
(allowed up to the 
amount that are 
financed abroad) (Jul.)




starting in Oct. 1977) 
     
  Increase in reserve rate 
for increases in 
non-resident free-yen 
accounts (from zero to 
50% of the amount in 
excess of October 
average balance) 
(Nov.) 
 Temporary  suspension 
of public offerings of 
short-term government 
securities (Nov.) 
(lifted Mar. 1978) 
  





Increase in reserve rate 
for increases in 
non-resident free-yen 
accounts (from 50% to 
100%) (Mar.) 
 Non-residents banned 
from acquiring 
yen-denominated 
bonds with the 
remaining duration to 
maturity of 5 years and 
1 month or shorter 
(Mar.) 
 









































Regulations on authorized foreign exchange banks Time Period 




Inward and outward 
portfolio securities 
investment 
Borrowings of foreign 
currency by private 
enterprises and 
cross-border securities 
issuance by residents 
and non-residents 
Others 
1979       
(With weakening of 
the yen starting in 
1979, restrictions on 
inflows eased or 
removed) 
Reduction in reserve 
rate for increases in 
non-resident free-yen 
accounts (from 100% to 
50% (Jan.), then to 0% 
(Feb.)) 
  Easing and elimination 




non-residents (From 5 
years and 1 month or 
shorter to 1 year and 1 
month or shorter 
(Jan.), then elimination 
of regulation (Feb.)) 
Increased flexibility in 
introduction of 
short-term and mid to 
long-term impact loans 
(Jun.) 
Abolishment of regulations on 
acceptance of prepayments for 
exports (May) (authorization no 
longer required even for amounts 
in excess of $500,000) 
1980       
(Measures to 
encourage capital 
inflows following sharp 
depreciation of the 
yen) 
Increased flexibility for 
introduction of foreign 
capital through main- 
office/branch account 
of authorized foreign 
exchange banks (Mar.) 
Official free-yen 
accounts by foreign 
governments and 
others exempted from 
Temporary Interest 
Rates Adjustment Law, 
and interest rates 
liberalized (Mar.) 
(increase in interest 









Removal of yen 
conversion limit from 
non-resident special 
accounts for securities 
(Dec.) 
Increased flexibility in 
overseas issuance of 
privately offered 
yen-denominated 
foreign bond by 
residents (Mar.) 
 
References: Ministry of Finance, Office of History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies Ed., "Showa Zaiseishi (History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Japan's 









































of History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies Ed., "Showa Zaiseishi (History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Japan's Showa Era – From 1952 to 1973 – 12. 
International Finance and Foreign Relations(2)," 1992, Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha Inc.; Ministry of Finance, Office of History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies 
Ed., "Showa Zaiseishi (History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Japan's Showa Era – From 1952 to 1973 – 18. References (6) International Finance and 
Foreign Relations," 1998, Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha Inc.; Ministry of Finance, Office of History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies Ed., "Showa Zaiseishi 
(History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Japan's Showa Era – From 1952 to 1973 – 19. Statistics," 1999, Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha Inc.; Ministry of Finance, 
Policy Research Institute, Office of History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies Ed., "Showa Zaiseishi (History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Japan's 
Showa Era – From 1974 to 1988 – 6. Finance," 2003, Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha Inc.; Ministry of Finance, Policy Research Institute, Office of History of Fiscal 
and Monetary Policies Ed., "Showa Zaiseishi (History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Japan's Showa Era – From 1974 to 1988 – 11. References (4) 
International Finance, Foreign Relations and Customs Administration," 2003, Toyo Keizai Shinpo-sha Inc.; Various issues of the Ministry of Finance 
Banking Bureau's "Annual Finance Report of the Banking Bureau"; Various issues of the Kinzai Institute for Financial Affairs, Inc.'s "Annual Report of the 
Ministry of Finance Securities Bureau"; Various issues of the Kinzai Institute for Financial Affairs, Inc.'s "Annual Report of the Ministry of Finance 
International Finance Bureau"; INUDA Akira, "Japan's Postwar Foreign Exchange Management Policy and Easing of Regulations on Long-term and 
Short-term Capital Transactions: A 30-year Look Back from The General Prohibition of the Foreign Exchange Law (1949) to General Liberalization of the 
Revised Foreign Exchange Law (1979)", 2000, Chuokoron Jigyo Shuppan; FUJITA Tsuneo, "Japan's Recent Foreign Exchange Policy (Vols. I, II, and II of 
three-part series)," Ministry of Finance Finance, Jul.-Sep. 1971. 
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III.2.1.  Current  Account  Liberalization 
 
   First, as mentioned above, the major liberalization of foreign exchange and capital account 
transactions was started by the 1960 Plan for Liberalization of Trade and Foreign Exchange. 
Under this initiative, the first policy issue was the liberalization of current-account foreign 
exchange transactions, in order to move to the IMF Article 8 status in April 1964. As described 




III.2.2.    Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct Investment and Other Forms of Inward Investment 
 
      The next major move toward liberalization was related to inward foreign direct investment. 
While the IMF's Articles of Agreement allow controls on capital account transactions, the 
OECD make it a principle to liberalize capital accounts. Consequent to its membership in the 
OECD in April 1964, Japan faced the need to remove its capital controls. At this time, Japan was 
also under rapidly increasing pressure from Western countries to liberalize capital transactions. 
In June 1967, the Cabinet adopted a decision on the Liberalization of Inward Foreign Direct 
Investment (“the First Capital Liberalization Package”), and began liberalizing inward foreign 
direct investment. By May 1973, the Japanese government had adopted and implemented a total 
of five capital liberalization packages, in addition to the automobile liberalization in 1971. By 
May 1976, when transitional treatments extended to some industries expired, inward foreign 
direct investment had been completely liberalized, excluding 4 exception industries.
22  
      Regarding other inward investment, acquisition by non-residents of up to a certain share of 
a Japanese company's stock had been allowed (automatic approval was granted), as long as the 
purpose of the acquisition was not to participate in the management of the company. In parallel 
with the liberalization of inward foreign direct investment starting in 1967 mentioned above, 
this maximum share was gradually increased. 
 
III.2.3.    Liberalization of Outward Foreign Direct Investment and Other Forms of Outward Investment 
 
     The easing of restrictions on outward foreign direct investment was slightly delayed to the 
easing of restrictions on inward direct investment. Its liberalization began in October 1969, and 
outward foreign direct investment was generally liberalized in June 1972.   
The liberalization of outward portfolio securities investment was further delayed. While 
                                                                            
21  One of the issues for transition to Article 8 status was restriction on foreign travel. Although the IMF 
requested strongly that restrictions on travel for tourism be lifted, in the end the restrictions were left in 
place, with a special exception granted by the Board of Directors of the IMF.   
22  The four exception industries are agriculture, forestry and fisheries, mining, petroleum and leather and 
leather product manufacturing.   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 209 
 
residents had previously been completely prohibited from purchasing foreign securities, in April 
1970 an investment trust was authorized to include foreign securities in its portfolio for the first 
time. From this point until the mid 1970s, the purchase of foreign securities was gradually 
liberalized for certain institutional investors such as life insurance companies and securities 
firms, and also for ordinary investors (via securities firms). 
 
III.2.4.  Overall  Tendency-Inward First and Outward Followed- 
 
   Thus, after the liberalization of current accounts, transactions leading to the inflow of 
capital, such as direct investment into Japan, were first liberalized, and the liberalization of 
transactions leading to the outflow of capital followed with some delay. Note that capital flows 
other than those mentioned above, such as so-called "impact loans" (foreign currency 
denominated borrowings by private enterprises with no pre-specified limitations on its use) and 
the issuance of securities overseas by resident enterprises and the issuance of securities in Japan 
by non-residents were subject to case-by-case examination, with the result that they were 
handled encouragingly or discouragingly (or in some cases prohibitively) under the policy stance 
adopted by the overseeing authorities at the time. 
 
III.2.5.  Creation  of  Non-resident Free Yen Accounts 
 
      One salient feature of Japan's capital-account liberalization that stood out from this general 
sequence was the establishment of non-resident free yen accounts in July 1960, at a very early 
stage in Japan's liberalization process. These accounts could be used by non-residents to 
deposit those yen that they received, when (1) a resident made payments in yen for a current 
account transaction such as importation to Japan; or (2) those payments for which foreign 
currency transfer is permitted (i.e. dividend payments approved under the Foreign Capital Law) 
were made in yen by residents. And it was allowed to convert these yen into foreign currency at 
any time. This decision on the introduction of free yen accounts was paired with the decision to 
allow the use of yen for foreign payments (the adoption of yen-denominated foreign exchange), 
and may have been considered as conducive to the promotion of yen-denominated trade in the 
future. However, the establishment of non-resident free yen accounts opened the path for the 
inflow of short-term capital for the first time. This was made possible as, in addition to the 
funds of (1) and (2) above, (3) non-residents were authorized to deposit in their free-yen 
accounts, those yen that they obtained through the sale of foreign currency to banks. The 
government was concerned with "hot money" flowing in through free-yen accounts and therefore 
only authorized their creation in authorized foreign exchange banks located in Japan, so that the 
authorities could monitor them. At the time, however, the authorities did not foresee a 
particularly large inflow of short-term capital to such accounts, and thought that short-term 210  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
capital would be beneficial so long as they were controlled. But in reality, the flow of capital 
through free-yen accounts made up one of the major portions of the short-term capital flowing 
through the banks in later years, and handling of this became an important issue (this point will 
be taken up in the following section). 
 
III.2.6.    Use of Banks as a Mechanism for Foreign Exchange Control 
 
   Another key characteristic of Japan's capital account liberalization was that the role of 
authorized foreign exchange banks in controlling foreign exchange was maintained until the 
very late stage of liberalization. In other words, under the Foreign Exchange Law, authorized 
foreign exchange banks played a major role in tracking overseas transactions, and verifying their 
legal appropriateness. These functions were basically maintained even after the reforms of 1980; 
it was only after the reforms of 1997 which eliminated the authorized foreign exchange bank 
system, liberalizing foreign exchange business, that the requirements on banks and other 
institutions which conduct overseas money transfers and other types of foreign-exchange 
transactions to confirm the legal appropriateness of such conduct were greatly reduced. Thus, 
authorized foreign exchange banks also played a major role in carrying out foreign exchange 
control measures to regulate short-term capital to be discussed in the following section. 
 
III.3.    Instability in International Financial Markets and Regulations on Short-term Capital 
Flow from the Late 1960s through the 1970s (Figure 3, Tables 2) 
 
III.3.1.  Overview 
 
      This section describes the regulatory measures on foreign exchange and capital transactions 
taken by the Japanese government in response to the major external shocks from the late 1960s 
through the 1970s: The so-called "Nixon Shock" of 1971; the transition to a general float in early 
1973; the turmoil in the international financial markets following the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979; 
and the massive movement of short-term capital. This period can be divided into six 
sub-periods: (I) A switch of regulatory stance from the traditional inflow promotion to inflow 
restrictions around the time of the Nixon Shock (late 1960s to around mid-1971); (II) Easing of 
such regulations immediately following the Smithsonian Accord, and their subsequent 
re-strengthening (end-1971 to around mid-1973); (III) A change to a policy of encouraging 
capital inflow after the first oil shock (end-1973 to 1974); (IV) Easing of regulations under the 
relative stability of the international financial markets (1975 to around mid-1977); (V) A return 
to a strengthening of inflow restrictions, consequent to the continuing appreciation of the yen 
(end 1977 to 1978); and (VI) A re-switching of policy toward encouraging capital inflow, in 
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Below is a brief review of each of these sub-periods and their environments. 
 
III.3.2.  Developments  in  six  sub-periods 
 
(I) A switch of regulatory stance to inflow restrictions and regulations on short-term capital 
    around the time of the Nixon Shock (late 1960s to around mid-1971) 
   From the end of the war, Japan basically had a trade deficit for a long time and the 
traditional policy stance regarding capital flow was to promote its inflow. However, the basic 
trend of its trade balance changed to surplus from around mid-1960s and there was a sharp rise 
in foreign reserves toward the end of the 1960s. With this change of Japan's external position, 
its policy stance also changed greatly from around the late 1960s to the 1970s. In order to stem 




   Table  2  shows  major  short-term capital regulations between the 1960s and 1970s for the four 
main short-term capital flow channels: (1) via authorized foreign exchange banks, such as 
acceptance of deposits and borrowing; (2) inward portfolio security investment; (3) foreign- 
currency borrowings by enterprises and resident/non-resident cross-border borrowing through 
the issue of securities; (4) other categories. The description below is based largely on this table.   
   As authorized foreign exchange banks provided one of the main channels for short-term 
capital inflows, one of the key regulatory measures on short-term capital had been via the 
regulation of authorized foreign exchange banks. In the early 1960s, there were already 
regulations on the foreign currency position of authorized foreign exchange bank, stipulating 
requirements for foreign-currency reserves on external short-term debt, regulations on 
outstanding balance of foreign short-term borrowing, and the like. Then in February 1968, 
regulations on yen conversion of foreign assets were put into place alongside the existing 
regulations, setting a maximum limit on the value of foreign currency assets that could be 
converted into yen (“the yen conversion limit”). In February 1972, this regulation was further 
strengthened, with conversion into yen totally prohibited in principle (foreign currency taken 
                                                                            
23 In October 1971, the Ministry of Finance stated the following: "Japan's foreign exchange system is 
structured in such a way as to discourage outflows, and encourage inflows. From around November of 
last year, however, we have been administering the system so as to encourage outflows and discourage 
inflows, without changing the law… In the future as well … we will continue to make a move from 
“heater” policy to “cooler” policy through administration of the system.” (Ministry of Finance, Office of 
History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies Ed. (1992) p 419) 
24 The Ministry of Finance, Office of History of Fiscal and Monetary Policies (1992) p 337 states that it 
was in 1969 when the need to stem increases in foreign reserves was first clearly recognized as policy 
agenda. This recognition arose from international criticism of Japan’s trade surplus as well as the 
destabilizing effect on the foreign exchange and financial markets, as indicated in this document, i.e. (1) 
a need to avoid such increases in light of international sentiment – while many countries around the 
world were suffering from dwindling foreign-currency reserves, those of Japan were surging; and (2) one 
of the main causes of the surge in foreign-currency reserves was the inflow of short-term capital, which 
was beginning to have a destabilizing influence not only on foreign exchange markets, but on domestic 
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from abroad needed to be used in the form of foreign-currency assets)
25. In September 1968, 
companies were also completely banned from taking so-called impact loans (short-term foreign 
currency loans without restrictions on use). 
   While these restrictions on inflow were being implemented, measures started to be 
introduced to encourage the outflow of capital, including the liberalization of outward direct 
investment in October 1969, and the liberalization of outward securities investment in April 
1970.  
      Despite these measures, however, there was a sudden surge in the flow of short-term capital 
into Japan, due to a sharp fall in interest rates abroad starting in the fall of 1970, and the 
European currency instability of May 1971. This inflow generally took three forms: (1) opening of 
free-yen deposit accounts; (2) purchase of public/corporate bonds by non-residents; and (3) a 
massive flow of export prepayments
26. As for (1) above, the maximum limit was imposed on the 
outstanding balance of free-yen deposits, prohibiting the balance on or after 28 August 1971 
from being greater than their balance as of 27 August 1971, which was just after the so-called 
Nixon Shock (in coordination, a banks as a whole was prohibited from having external debt 
balances greater than their balance as of 18 August). As for item (2), a de-facto ban was 
implemented on the acquisition by non-residents of short-term government securities in March 
1971 and of non-listed public/corporate bonds in May 1971. As for (3), a request was made in 
May 1971 for voluntary restraints on overseas local loans by authorized foreign exchange banks, 
which were thought to be financing prepayments
27. After the Nixon Shock, however, there was 
also a massive surge in prepayments, and thus on 19 August, the Ministry of Finance conducted 
an examination of the state of prepayments, investigating authorized foreign exchange banks 
and trading companies
28. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry also requested 
                                                                            
25 Regulations on conversion to yen were first adopted with the goal of preventing short-term capital 
entering the country from being converted to yen, and providing a means of circumventing domestic 
financial tightening    (it was attempted to direct foreign currency entering the country to its use in the 
form of foreign currency such as import financing and overseas local lending), amidst a need to accept 
more short-term capital in order to cooperate with the US dollar defense. Starting in 1969, however, the 
motivation seems to have changed toward strictly regulating the inflow of short-term capital in order to 
minimize the increase of foreign-currency reserves (Ministry of Finance, Office of History of Fiscal and 
Monetary Policies Ed. (1992) p 213). 
26According to NAKAYAMA Takashi, "Transition to a Floating Rate System and Restrictions on the Inflow 
of short-term capital," International Finance, issue 478, 15 Oct. 1971, during the month of August 1971, 
Japan's foreign-currency reserves grew by just under $4.6 billion, over half of which was via export 
prepayments. The volume was incredibly large in light of the fact that the total amount of inter-bank 
spot foreign exchange transactions during the whole year of preceding 1970 was just $ 4.8 billion. 
27  In May 1971, the total prepayment inflow reached $450 million, nearly 10 times the customary monthly 
pace of about $50 million (NAKAYAMA Takashi (1971)).   
28  The investigations turned up a substantial number of transactions with destinations marked as "the US 
or Canada" or "Europe," the only product name given as "general merchandise," and the shipping date 
listed as "soon" or "prompt," with no firm date given (OHASHI Hiroshi, "Strengthening Regulations on 
Short-term Capital," International Finance, 1 Oct. 1971, Issue 477). While the exemption threshold was 
subsequently raised , one Ministry official later wrote, "When we performed the foreign exchange 
investigation, at the time when the regulation was for $100,000, we saw a huge increase in products 
being sold for $99,000 per shipment" (FUJIOKA Masao, "40 Years of Internationalization – Japan's Path," 
1994, The Institute of Foreign Exchange and Trade Research, p 101).   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 213 
 
trading companies to implement voluntary restrains. The massive inflow continued, however, 
and so on 31 August, a complete ban was placed on the conversion into yen of foreign currency 
received as prepayments (sums valued at $10,000 or less were exempt). This almost completely 
put a stop to the inflow of prepayments
29. 
 
(II) Easing of regulations immediately following the Smithsonian Accord, and their subsequent 
re-strengthening (end-1971 to around mid-1973) 
   When the Smithsonian Accord was reached in December 1971, the Ministry of Finance 
phased out, between December and January, those restrictions put in place after the Nixon 
Shock, including the outstanding balance limit on free-yen deposits (the one adopted in August) 
and restrictions on export prepayments (the one adopted in August). However, restrictions on 
the acquisition of non-listed public/corporate bonds by non-residents were left in place; 
additionally, the yen conversion limit was maintained as a cornerstone of regulations.   
      In early January 1971, however, the amount of short-term capital flowing into Japan became 
massive again, and the control of foreign exchange was re-strengthened. In June 1972, a new 
reserve-deposit system with a required reserve rate (25%) was put in place on the amount of 
increase of free-yen accounts. In July, this rate was raised to 50%. The yen conversion limit was 
also strengthened (in May from a monthly average balance basis to a daily balance basis). As 
export prepayments also flew in massively immediately after the restrictions were lifted, the 
restriction was re-introduced in February requiring approval for export prepayments of greater 
than $10,000 per transaction. In June, the amount eligible for exemption was lowered to $5,000. 
Another form of capital inflow was for a shipping company to export a used ship, immediately 
convert the acquired foreign currency into yen, and then charter the ship back, paying back the 
charter fee over a long period. In order to discourage this type of foreign-exchange manipulation, 
a regulation was put into effect in October requiring the individual approval by the Bank of 
Japan for each ship and aircraft charter agreement
30. Also, acquisition of stocks and bonds by 
non-residents was limited to the respective amount of stocks and bonds that have been sold 
(zero net inflow). 
      At the same time that these restrictions on inflow were being put into place, in and after 1971, 
measures aiming at increasing the demand for foreign currency were implemented, including 
relaxation of restrictions on taking foreign currency outside the country on travel and 
liberalizing the possession of foreign currency in the private sector. In January 1973, however, 
the European currency crisis flared up again, and all major currencies, including the yen, moved 
                                                                            
29  In the case of a dollar-denominated export agreement, there is normally no reason for the other party to 
pre-pay, even if there is fear that the value of the yen will rise. Prepayment was a defensive measure 
taken by Japanese export companies when dealing with overseas branches or subsidiaries; at the time, 
this type of transaction accounted for about 60% of Japan's exports. 
30INUDA Akira (2000), p 326. This is a hedging operation through which a shipping or airline company 
that expects to receive dollar denominated revenue for the periods to come creates dollar denominated 
liabilities, i.e., dollar denominated payment obligations, thereby hedging for exchange rate risk. 214  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
to a float against the US dollar in February to March 1973.
31  
 
(III) The change to a policy of encouraging capital inflow after the first oil shock 
(end-1973 to 1974) 
 
      After the move to a float, Japan's balance of payments worsened substantially, amidst rising 
inflation caused by a policy of economic expansion which had been pursued to that time under a 
rising yen. In the third and fourth quarters of 1973, Japan had a trade deficit. In October of that 
year, the six OPEC members announced a large increase in crude oil prices. This sparked the 
first oil crisis (so-called "oil shock"); due to the subsequent severe sell-off of the yen and buying 
up of the dollars, the yen depreciated greatly.   
   In order to respond to this development, the government changed again the direction of 
foreign exchange management policy by 180 degrees from the one discouraging inflow and 
encouraging outflow to the one encouraging inflows and discouraging outflows from November 
that year to February in the following year. Measures taken to encourage the inflow of capital 
included lowering the deposit reserve rate for increases in free-yen deposit balances (from 50% 
to 10%), suspension of application of yen conversion limit to free-yen account balances 
(excluding main office/branch accounts), increase in the exemption threshold of restrictions on 
export prepayments (from $5,000 to $10,000, then to $100,000), a policy of flexible approval of 
impact loans and abolishment of restrictions on net increases in securities holdings by 
non-residents (the one adopted in October 1972). Measures taken to discourage the outflow of 
capital included discouraging the issue of securities in Japan by non-residents. Despite these 
foreign exchange control measures, however, the December 1973 announcement of a further hike 
in the price of petroleum rekindled the concern with Japan's balance of payments, and the yen 
sharply depreciated until early 1974. 
      Then in June 1974, West Germany's Herstat Bank was ordered to suspend its operations after 
a failed foreign exchange speculation. This brought the instability of the euro markets to the 
surface, and it gradually became more difficult for Japan’s authorized foreign exchange banks to 
obtain euro-dollars. July saw the emergence of the "Japan rate" problem, where Japanese banks 
were being charged a rate of 1 to 2% above average. For this reason, the government took a 
number of measures to encourage the inflow of capital; it eliminated the deposit reserve 
requirement on increases in free-yen accounts; it eliminated restrictions on the acquisition of 
short-term government securities by non-residents; it re-started the issuance of “Out-In” 
foreign bonds by residents; it eased restrictions on export prepayments; the measures included a 
p u b l i c  l o a n  f r o m  S a u d i  A r a b i a  b y  t h e  J a p a n e s e  g o v e r n m e n t  i t s e l f .  I t  a l s o  t o o k  m e a s u r e s  t o  
discourage outflow, including lowering the limit on foreign currency that could be taken 
                                                                            
31This was performed as a "managed float." From the re-opening of the market on 19 March, until the first 
oil shock in Oct. 1973, the yen rate stayed in the 264-266 range.     K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 215 
 
overseas on travel. Partly due to these measures, entering the month of September, the "Japan 
rate" was nearly eliminated.   
 
(IV) Easing of regulations under the relative stability of the international financial markets 
(1975 to around mid-1977) 
 
      In the latter half of 1974, the Japan's current account almost restored the balanced position, 
and Japan’s economy finally got out of the international financial crisis since the Nixon Shock. 
With the subsequent relative stability of the international financial situation, regulations were 
eased, including the elimination of the yen conversion limit and a transition to regulations on 
spot foreign exchange position limit. Meanwhile, restrictions on the outflow of capital were also 
eased, including easing of restrictions on overseas local loans by authorized foreign exchange 
banks, easing of restrictions on the acquisition of foreign securities by residents, and re-start of 
securities issuance of non-residents in Japan. This could be called a foreign exchange 
management policy targeting at expanded equilibrium, responding to an increased inflow of 
capital with measures to encourage the outflow of capital
32. 
 
(V) A return to a strengthening of inflow restrictions, consequent to the continuing 
appreciation of the yen (end-1977 to 1978) 
 
   From October 1977 until the following year (1978), however, there was another massive 
inflow of short-term capital. Foreign-exchange controls and regulations on capital transactions 
were again strengthened, including imposition of a deposit reserve rate of 50% on increases in 
non-resident free yen accounts (increased to 100% in 1978), and such strict measures as a 
temporarily suspension of public offerings of short-term government securities.   
 
(VI) A re-switching of policy toward encouraging capital inflow, in response to independent 
fall of the yen consequent to the second oil shock (1979 to 1980) 
 
   Conversely, when the second oil shock occurred in 1979, the yen independently followed a 
downward path, and measures were taken in 1979 and 80 to encourage the inflow of capital, 
including lowering the deposit reserve rate for increases in free-yen accounts (100% to 50%, 
then to 0%), and easing of restrictions on the acquisition of bonds by non-residents. Other 
measures to encourage inflow included greater flexibility in approving impact loans, and of 
issuing foreign debts by residents. 
 
                                                                            
32  This is the assessment of INUDA (p 343). 216  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
III.3.3 . Subsequent situations 
 
      Thus, from the end of the 1960s through the 1970s, the government was engaged in a dizzying 
series of policy reversals on foreign exchange control and regulations on capital account 
transactions, in order to prevent the short-term capital flows from destabilizing the market 
during times of drastic change in the international financial markets. But this policy was also a 
subject of much criticism domestic and abroad.
33 With the capital account liberalization 
promoted by the comprehensive revisions to the Foreign Exchange Law (1980), and with Japan's 
continued growth and its further strengthened external position, such policy ceased to be 
observed after entering the 1980s
34. 
 
III.3.4.    Effectiveness of Foreign Exchange Controls and Regulations on Capital Account Transactions 
 
   Although a quantitative analysis of whether the goals of these foreign exchange measures 
were achieved is beyond the scope of this paper, at the very least the relevant government 
agencies at that time were confident in their ability of managing capital flow via foreign 
exchange measures
35. Regarding its response to the Nixon Shock, it was later stated by a senior 
official of the Ministry of Finance which was in charge of the matter that "The following three 
measures were powerful and effective; restrictions on non-resident free-yen balances, 
restrictions on foreign debt balances by banks, and restrictions on export prepayments"
36. To be 
sure, the August 1971 restrictions on export prepayments stopped these prepayments nearly 
completely. Additionally, the yen rate was relatively stable from September until mid-November 
1971 after the Nixon Shock, and also from the general float in March 1973 until the oil shock of 
October of the same year. Even allowing for the effect of interventions, it is likely that controls 
on foreign exchange had a certain stabilizing effect on the market under the conditions prevailed 
                                                                            
33  FUJIOKA (1994) p 100 argues that "After the oil crisis was overcome, there was a wave of criticism, both 
at home and abroad, of the alternating use of 'heater' and 'cooler” foreign exchange controls." 
34 One possible exception was a series of measures to ease restrictions on the outflow of capital by the 
Ministry of Finance starting in the summer of 1986, after a major appreciation of the yen following the 
Plaza Accord. This measure liberalized investment in foreign securities by insurance companies and 
other financial institutions, and is described as follows: "Some argue … that this was an attempt to halt 
the rise of the yen under the current conditions of the foreign exchange rate," but "the measure in 
question was part of a series of moves by the Ministry of Finance to liberalize finance and capital 
account transactions" (KONDO Takehiko, "Easing of Regulations on the Outflow of Capital," Ministry of 
Finance, Finance, Oct. 1986). 
35For example, FUJIOKA (1994) p. 35 states that Japan got through the severe convulsions in international 
finance shortly after it began its internationalization through a masterful use of world-class 
foreign-exchange control.   
36  FUJIOKA (1994) p 35. At the same time, however, FUJIOKA states that there are limits to what foreign 
exchange controls can accomplish after the economy has grown and internationalization has progressed. 
The greater the scale of trade, the more difficult it is to respond to leads and lags with foreign exchange 
controls; restrictions on foreign debt balances by banks and on non-resident free-yen deposit balances 
are criticized both in Japan and abroad, and as internationalization of the economy progresses, it 
becomes impossible to apply these measures (ibid, pp 100-101).   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 217 
 
at that time, even if they did not produce major reversals in the direction of the market
37. 
 
III.4.  Summary 
 
      The followings are the key points of Japan's experiences described above. 
 
(1)  The liberalization of the economy took place in the following order: trade liberalization, 
capital account liberalization, and the liberalization of finance. 
(2)  Capital accounts liberalization proceeded very gradually over a few decades. 
(3)  With regard to the type of capital account transactions, liberalization of inward investment 
in Japan, including inward direct investment, generally preceded liberalization of outward 
investment.  
(4)  Non-resident free-yen deposit accounts were introduced at an early stage, which later 
became one of the key channels for the inflow of short-term capital.   
(5)  Portfolio securities investment and trade-related payments also became key channels for the 
short-term capital flow.   
(6)  Foreign exchange controls and regulations on capital transactions were frequently adopted 
in order to manage short-term capital flows and are thought to have had effectiveness of a 
certain degree in preventing market instability.   
(7)  Almost throughout the liberalization process, the authorized foreign exchange banks were 
used as an effective foreign exchange management mechanism. 
 
IV. China's Capital Account Regulations and the Implications 
from Japan's Experiences to China 
 
      This Chapter explores the implications of Japan's experiences for China. 
                                                                            
37  FUJIOKA (1994) pp 100-101 wrote about an episode in which he defended Japan's foreign exchange 
controls which was a subject of criticism from Western countries by stating: "Germany is championing 
liberalization, but they have a history of defeats to currency crisis." In fact, after setting an exchange rate 
of 4.20 marks to the dollar in January 1953, in March 1961 it raised the value of the mark by 4.19%, to 
4.00 marks to the dollar, in an attempt to stem a trade surplus and discourage the speculative inflow of 
capital. Then in 1969, it twice closed its foreign-exchange markets due to massive inflows of short-term 
capital amidst expectations of a revaluation of the mark, and after temporarily (30 Sep. to 24 Oct.) 
discarding the tolerable range of exchange rate movements, it revalued the mark by 9.3%, to 3.66 marks 
to the dollar on 26 October of the same year. Subsequently, in May 1971, it was forced to move to a float 
amidst a massive inflow of capital. As background to this, West Germany was early to liberalize its 
foreign exchange control, and in the latter half of the 1960s, it had almost no regulations on capital 
account transactions. Subsequently, however, it strengthened its regulation in order to control the flow 
of capital, and by around end-1973, it had the most extensive capital controls in Europe. The capital 
controls that West Germany adopted in this period included not only such indirect measures as reserve 
obligations for foreign borrowings, but also such direct regulations as a de-facto ban on the acquisition 
of bonds by non-residents, and on the payment of deposit interest to non-residents by placing them 
under approval requirements. 218  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
Table  ３    Regulations on Capital Account Transactions in China 
   Outward Investment 
  (Outflow of Capital)  Inward Investment (Inflow of Capital) 
Direct 
investment 
- Authorization system 
(authorization by Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC) and State 
Administration of Foreign 
Exchange) 
- Authorization system (authorization by 





(Issuance of stocks/bonds in China 
by non-residents) 
- Prohibited 
(Overseas issuance of stocks by residents) 
- Authorization system 
(authorization by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission) 
(Overseas issuance of bonds by residents) 
- Authorization system 
































- Prohibited in principle (allowed 
only under special authorization of 
the Sate Council of the People’s 
Republic of China) 
 
(Bonds) 
- Possible only by financial 
institutions and other entities 
approved by the People's Bank of 
China (prohibited from investing 
foreign currencies obtained through 
conversion of RMB) 
(Stocks) 
- Prohibited in principle 







- Authorization system   
(long-term loans: longer than 1 
year) 
- Authorization by State 
Administration of Foreign 
Exchange 
- To be implemented in 
accordance with Foreign 
Capital Utilization Plan[1] 
(short term loans: 1 year or less) 
- Financial institutions are free 
to take short-term loans within 
balance limit approved by State 
Administration of Foreign 
Exchange 
(Although there is no need to 
gain approval for each 
transaction, after-the-fact 
report is required) 
Giving/taking 
loans in foreign 
currency 
- Possible only by financial 
institutions and other entities 
approved by the MOFTEC 




(Note, however, that 
registration with State 
Administration of Foreign 
Exchange required after the 
fact) 
Original note [1]  Every year, the State Development Planning Commission formulates a "Foreign Capital 
Utilization Plan," which determines the total sum of foreign debt and the policy for the 
use of foreign capital including direct investment. 
Original Source: IMF, "Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2001)" 
Source : AKAMA Hiroshi, MIFUNE Jun, and NORO Kunihisa, "The Chinese Foreign Exchange System," 
2002, Bank of Japan Monthly Survey, May 2002 Issue   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 219 
 
IV.1.    China's Capital Account Regulations
38 
 
      Table 3 gives an outline of China's main regulations on capital accounts. In comparison with 
the Japanese experience particularly over 1960’s and 1970’s described in the preceding Chapter, 
the following observations can be made of China's regulations:   
 
IV.1.1.  Commonalities  in  Basic  Framework 
 
(1)  China employs, as Japan did before 1980, a principle of general prohibition, with freedom 
given to exceptions, under which capital transactions are extensively regulated and 
authorization is awarded individually. China’s approach to liberalization through the 
selective easing of regulations is also similar to Japan's response before the comprehensive 
reforms of 1980. 
(2)  Japan strictly regulated foreign transactions by residents other than financial institutions, 
so that the effectiveness of the control of foreign exchange is ensured via oversight of 
financial institutions, and this mechanism also appears to exist in China. 
 
IV.1.2.    Commonalities in Substance of Regulations and Liberalization 
 
(1)  Until Japan switched to restrictive policy on capital inflows under short-term capital 
inflows before the Nixon Shock, its basic policy was to encourage the inflow of capital and 
discourage its outflow. Direction of China's basic policy seems to have been the same. 
Recently, however, a partial easing of regulations on the outflow of capital is being 
implemented in China.   
(2)  In Japan, inward direct investment was first liberalized in the process of liberalization, and 
this point is also common to China
39. 
(3)  Japan sought to separate domestic and foreign financial markets through such means as 
restrictions on the conversion of foreign currencies into yen, in order to prevent the inflow 
of foreign currency through the banks from impacting domestic financial markets. China as 
well in principle prohibits the conversion of borrowed foreign currency into the RMB 
without individual approval. 
 
                                                                            
38 Description of China's foreign-exchange controls and regulations on capital transactions are based on 
AKAMA Hiroshi, MIFUNE Jun, and NORO Kunihisa, "China's Foreign Exchange System," 2002, Bank of 
Japan Survey Monthly, May 2002 Issue, KUWATA Yoshimochi "China's Foreign Currency Controls Relating 
to Foreign-owned Enterprises: A practical manual for companies investing in China, 2003 edition," 
Mizuho Research Institute, and WATANABE Toshio, Ed., "China's Economy in the Midst of Dilemma," 
2003, Toyo Keizai Inc. 
39  In terms of actual inflows of FDIs, there is a big difference; while China has accepted a large amount of 
foreign direct investment, it was at a very low level in Japan at the time. 220  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
IV.1.3.  Differences 
 
(1)  The biggest difference between Japan's liberalization and that of China is the two countries' 
stance toward the internationalization of their currencies. Although Japan permitted the 
use of the yen in foreign settlements in 1960, China now prohibits the use of the RMB in 
international transactions.   
(2)  Reflecting such difference in policy, while Japan introduced the non-resident free-yen 
deposit account in 1960, no such system exists in China (however, starting in February 2004, 
individuals in possession of Hong Kong IDs were authorized to open RMB denominated 
deposit accounts in Hong-Kong banks).   
(3)  Since Japan authorized the Asian Development Bank to issue yen-denominated bonds in 
Japan in 1970, it has authorized each year anywhere from a dozen or so, to as many as 60 to 
70, yen-denominated bond issues by non-residents in Japan, although during the first oil 
shock, it had a policy of discouraging the issues. In contrast, China has not yet authorized 
any non-resident to issue a RMB denominated bond in China
40. 
(4)  Another salient difference is the handling of inward portfolio securities investment. 
Although Japan gradually eased restrictions on inward securities investment in parallel with 
inward direct investment, China generally prohibits inward portfolio securities investment 
(however, a QFII scheme, under which investors that satisfy certain conditions (Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors: QFII) are allowed to invest in domestic equities (A shares) 
has also recently been started in China, and liberalization is beginning)
41. 
(5)  Before the abolishment of foreign currency concentration system in 1972 (at the same time 
general residents were allowed to hold foreign-currency deposit accounts), the possession 
of foreign currency by residents other than banks was not allowed, with the exception of 
possession of a limited amount by trading companies, overseas shipping companies, and the 
like. In contrast, China allows certain export companies to possess up to a given amount of 
foreign currency, and does not place any limits on the amount of foreign currency that can 
be held by individuals. In other words, the possession of foreign currency by residents is 
more widespread in China.   
(6)  One Chinese regulation not seen in Japan is allowing foreign-owned companies to engage in 
activities not authorized for local companies ("supranational treatment" rather than 
national treatment). For instance, foreign-owned companies are allowed to borrow abroad 
(after-the-fact registration is required).   
                                                                            
40  It has been reported that the start of issuance of RMB denominated bond in the China’s domestic 
market by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank group and the Asian 
Development Bank will be approved shortly. (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, September 29, 2005) 
41  As for outward portfolio securities investment, Japan began its liberalization shortly after the inflow of 
short-term capital became an issue and by the mid-1970s, liberalization progressed encompassing 
general investors (via securities firms). The purchase of bonds by financial institutions approved by the 
People's Bank of China using foreign currency in possession has already been approved (stock investment 
is, however, prohibited in principle).   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 221 
 
IV.2.    Implications from Japan's Experiences to China 
 
   Based on the above-mentioned similarities and differences, let us examine the relevancy of 
Japan's experiences in the 1960s and 70s to China's policy for liberalization of capital accounts. 
 
IV.2.1.  Commonalities  in  Basic  Context 
 
(1)  From the latter half of 1960s, Japan rapidly increased its international presence against the 
background of continued strong economic growth and strengthened current account 
position, and capital account liberalization started to be recognized as a next foreign 
economic policy agenda after trade liberalization. As China currently maintains high 
economic growth, and is proceeding with trade liberalization following the accession of 
WTO membership, under generally favorable external position, there is a basic commonality 
of context between present China and Japan in the 1960’s and 1970’s.   
(2)  Japan's capital account liberalization process was made to be an extremely complex one due 
to major shocks occurred during this process, particularly by a change in the foreign 
exchange rate system (from a peg to a float), and a substantial currency revaluation. In this 
respect too, Japan’s experiences are very relevant to China as, while China’s formal 
exchange rate regime was announced to have been changed, actual enhancement of the 
flexibility in the rate movements reflecting market developments remains to be seen and 
also as China is still faced with expectations for a further revaluation of its currency. 
   
IV.2.2.  Differences  in  Environment 
 
(1)  On the other hand, there are major differences in the international environments between 
Japan at the time, and China today. One difference is the penetration of the idea of 
liberalization across the globe. Decades ago, foreign exchange restrictions and capital 
controls were not something uncommon even among the developed countries. By contrast, 
today, the developed countries have almost completely liberalized their capital accounts, 
and while there have been some strengthening of regulations following the Asian crisis, 
many developing countries have substantially liberalized their capital accounts.   
(2)  The international flow of capital is much greater today than it was decades ago. This 
increases the risk of a reversal of capital flow
42.   
                                                                            
42  Former IMF Economic counselor and Research Department Director Kenneth Rogoff has published a paper with three 
other IMF staff, providing a comprehensive survey of the recent empirical studies on the effects of integration into the 
international financial market by developing countries through capital account liberalization (Eswar Prasad, Kenneth 
Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei and M. Ayhan Kose, “Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical 
Evidence,” International Monetary Fund, 2003, IMF Occasional paper 220). The paper concludes, based on the results of 
the survey, first that there is no strong support for a theoretical argument that integration with the international 
financial market through capital account liberalization brings high growth through more efficient distribution of capital, 
and second that financially integrated developing countries suffer the negative influence on their macro-economic 
stability (measured as relative instability of consumption).    222  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
IV.2.3.  Implications  to  China  in light of Japan's Experiences 
 
(1)  Appropriateness of gradualism 
 
      Japan employed a policy of gradualism. It took about 20 years from 1960, when the Basic Plan 
for Liberalization of Trade and Foreign Exchange was adopted, to 1980 when the wholly revised 
and drastically liberalized Foreign Exchange Law was implemented. And nearly another 20 years 
had passed before foreign exchange business was liberalized in the late 1990’s. Capital account 
liberalization was considered to be an issue with "long and deep effects," and therefore a 
cautions approach was adopted. Meantime, it is sure that certain liberalization measures 
including introduction of the non-resident free yen account provided channels for short-term 
capital flows. However, such episodes are not regarded as a case where liberalization measures 
of capital accounts played a major role in triggering serious external crises. In this sense, Japan’s 
gradualism performed well particularly in the turbulent period of international financial market 
in the 1960’s to 70’s. Considering the following points, an approach based on gradualism seems 
to be appropriate for China as well.   
      First, risk of large and abrupt capital flows may be already high for China. This is partly due 
to the change in the general environment, i.e., increase in the volume of international capital 
flows. But in addition to that, we should take note of the fact that current account related 
capital flows have become rather large in China. As examined above, during the Nixon Shock, 
one of Japan's largest channels for the inflow of short-term capital was though prepayments for 
exports(the upper chart in Figure 4). A similar trend (while in opposite direction) can be found 
in the movement of trade credit in China during the Asian crisis in 1997 and 1998 (the lower 
chart in Figure 4). There may have been leads and lags under a devaluation expectation of the 
RMB; collection of export payments was delayed (increase in export credit assets), and import 
payments were paid early (decrease in import credit liabilities)
43. Furthermore, under a 
devaluation expectation, it may happen that residents try to retain funds abroad via the 
under-reporting of export earnings and the over-reporting of import payments. In short, it 
should be recognized that even under the current regulatory system, there is already a great risk 
of short-term capital flow including trade related flows when expectations grow for a change of 
exchange rate or for an instability in the balance of payments position. These risks are bound to 
increase as trade expands. As hedging and speculative activities relating to current transactions 
may increase in the future, the effectiveness of regulation could be also reduced. 
   Second, in relation to the first point, it must be noted that over a term of few years, it is 
                                                                            
43  As of the end of 1996, China's short-term debt balance was $25.40 billion (7.4% of foreign debt balance), 
and remained relatively low at the end of 1997, at $31.50 billion. During the Asian crisis, however, there 
was a huge outflow of "other capital", amounting to -$25.50 billion in 1997, and -$43.70 billion in 1998 . 
Therefore, if there had not been a major inflow of FDI during this period, it is likely that the RMB would 
have been subject to a major downward pressure.   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 223 
 
possible for the direction of capital flow to change by a 180-degree. As described earlier, Japan 
had several major capital flow reversals, from a period of inflow prior to the Nixon Shock, to a 
period of outflow starting around the first oil shock, to a period of inflow from 1977 to 1978, and 
then again to a period of outflow following the second oil shock. The Asian crisis showed a 
destructive power of capital flow reversals. China also must proceed with the possibility of a 
period of capital outflow clearly in mind. 
   T h i r d ,  t h e  r i s k  o f  c a p i t a l  f l i g h t  m u s t  a l s o  b e  t a k e n  i n t o  a c c o u n t .  J a p a n ' s  1 9 8 0  r e v i s i o n  
eliminated the limit (¥3 million) on the amount of foreign currency, acquired through the 
conversion of yen into foreign currency, that could be held by residents in foreign-currency 
deposits, allowing an unlimited amount to be held. But the balance of foreign currency deposit 
stays at a low level; as of the end of 2003, they accounted for only 1.6% of deposit balances in 
domestic banks, while they are increasing in recent years. In contrast, resident foreign-currency 
accounts make up around 8% of all deposit balances in local domestic banks in China
44. The fact 
that possession of foreign currency is more widespread in China than it is in Japan indicates the 
higher orientation in China toward foreign currency holdings, which is noteworthy. It should be 
also noted that while in Japan, the ratio of M2 to GDP was about 133% as of end-2002, it is quite 
high in China at nearly 200% as of end-2003
45. 
   Fourth, as is often pointed out, the Chinese financial sector is far from resilient; domestic 
banks suffer from problems regarding soundness of their balance sheet with bad loans to state 
owned enterprises and insufficient regulatory and supervisory framework. Therefore, if capital 
accounts liberalization was implemented before these problems are corrected, it is possible that 
weak financial institutions increase their dependence on external capital, raising vulnerability 
to external shocks. So, capital account liberalization need to proceed taking into account such 
factors as improvements in the soundness of domestic financial institutions and the degree of 
effective functioning of domestic financial markets
46. 
                                                                            
44  See WATANABE Toshio Ed. (2003) p 162. 
45  XFN, 14 Apr. 2004 
46  As described in the text, in Japan, the capital account was liberalized before financial liberalization 
took place. The reason why such sequencing did not bring about serious problems such as excessive 
domestic lending financed by foreign capital and a rise in external vulnerability may include the fact that 
financial institutions were generally sound in the 1960’s and 70’s reflecting strength of the borrowing 
corporate sector at that time and that bank supervision was rather strict as shown in the very strict 
foreign exchange position limit for the banks.   224  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
Figure 4    Japan and China: Trends of Trade Credits 
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(2)  Points to be noted in the formulation of a practical liberalization program 
 
   Under a gradual approach, a practical liberalization program may need to incorporate 
following considerations.
47 
   First, it is vital to take into account the concomitant risks arising from liberalizations of 
each type of transaction, and liberalize those with the least risk first (e.g., foreign direct 
investment) and those with greater risk late (e.g., short-term loans). We should remember that 
non-resident free yen accounts, which was introduced as early as in 1960, provided an important 
channel for short-term capital in the period of turbulence in the market. 
   Second, it seems to be appropriate to start with experimental liberalization, and then 
proceed to general liberalization based on the experiences of the experimental liberalization. 
     Third, it may be necessary to be prepared for a flexible revision to the initial liberalization 
schedule or for a temporary halt to liberalization process in response to a change in 
circumstances. 
      Fourth, is seems to be important to retain emergency measures for the event of a crisis.   
      Fifth, if it is the case that Japan's control of foreign exchange had a certain effect in ensuring 
market stability, it is likely because Japan tended to limit those capital transaction that were 
conducted by other entities than banks, and tried to effectively control capital flow through 
supervision of banks. It is also useful for China to utilize the control mechanism through the 
banking system in its own liberalization
48. 
 
(3)  Appropriate timeframe and avoidance of risk of policy reversals 
 
      While cautious approach may be preferable, the following two points need to be noted. 
   First, while it is recommended to proceed gradually, controlling risks, the effectiveness of 
regulations must also be taken into account. For example, in the 1990s, Chile and Columbia 
made it obligatory to maintain an interest-free reserve deposit for foreign borrowings, in order 
to restrict the inflow of short-term capital. In order to plug loopholes, the countries 
subsequently expanded the regulations to other potential channels for the inflow of short-term 
capital (Chile in particular applied this requirement even to FDI of speculative nature). Thus, 
the development of financial techniques and the increased scale of capital flow may make 
regulations less effective than they were in the 1960s and 70s
49. The longer the control measures 
are in force, the less effective they may become. Considering this factor, it is unrealistic to take 
                                                                            
47  Points presented in IMF Occasional paper 211 were taken into account in this part. 
48  Even if banks may be expected to perform its function of management, as trade and other international 
activities expand, the administrative burden relating to foreign exchange on the banks may be rapidly 
increasing. Thus for the sake of effectiveness of banks function in vital areas, non-essential tasks must 
be streamlined.   
49  See ARIYOSHI Akira et al, "Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and 
Liberalization,"2000, IMF Occasional Paper 190 pp. 6-18. 226  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
in liberalization as long a period as decades as Japan did. A substantially shortened period need 
to be considered. 
   Second, Japan frequently implemented foreign exchange and capital control measures in 
response to capital flows, or took steps backward in its liberalization in response to the 
situation. However, unlike the 1960s and 70s, the idea of liberalization has penetrated today, and 
many countries, both developed and developing, have made considerable progress toward 
liberalizing their capital accounts. Additionally, unlike Japan at the time, there are currently a 
large number of foreign-owned banks and other foreign-owned enterprises in China, and these 
enterprises have many affiliates worldwide. In light of these facts, negative reactions to 
backward measures, if implemented, could be very strong. It is thus important to move ahead 
steadily, without any major "backward steps" in liberalization to the maximum extent possible, 
and it is better to respond to changes in the situation by halting further liberalization and using 
emergency measure that are reserved. 
 
(4)  Appropriateness of de facto change in the exchange rate regime before the major 
liberalization 
 
      While the China’s foreign exchange rate regime has been formally changed recently, how the 
formal change leads to a de facto change in the rate determination yet remains to be seen. On the 
relationship between such de facto change and liberalization of capital accounts, it must be 
noted that the liberalization of capital account regulations generally increases the amount of 
capital that can move when a shock occurs. It makes no difference whether liberalization is for 
the promotion of outward flow or inward flow. For example, liberalizing outward portfolio 
securities investment will initially promote the outflow of capital. However, in due course, 
balance will build up, and their sale could function as an inflow factor (This consideration 
cannot be irrelevant to the outward investment in foreign bond recently started by the approved 
financial institutions). Consequently, if there is a concern about the impact on capital flow by a 
substantial change in the (de fact) foreign exchange rate management, it is better first to see the 
extent and nature of the effects of such change in the exchange rate on capital flows and not to 
undertake major liberalization of capital accounts before such change. 
   It was argued in the above that strengthening of the domestic financial sector need to be 
realized before the capital account liberalization is implemented. If liberalization of finance 
lagged behind the liberalization of capital accounts, the movement of capital between regulated 
domestic financial markets and free overseas markets could be accelerated. In the case of Japan 
such pressure may have been mitigated by a floated exchange rate. If the flow of capital to and 
from a regulated domestic financial market is liberalized under a fixed exchange-rate system, 
then it can amplify the volume of capital flow. This risk is maybe far greater now than in decades 
ago, since the absolute volume of capital flow is also greater. Therefore, it is very risky to   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 227 
 
enhance integration between domestic and international financial markets without flexible 
exchange rate movements. 
 
(5)  Other considerations 
 
   Some elements that were not present in Japan are: (A) the existence of RMB deposit 
accounts by Hong Kong ID holders; (B) preferential treatments of foreign enterprises; (C) a 
different treatment between foreign-owned and local banks. Factor (A) could become a channel 
for the inflow of short-term capital, which is quite similar to what non-resident free-yen 
deposits brought about in Japan
50. As for (B) and (C) above, if it is not possible to maintain 
unequal treatment of domestic and foreign capital in the future, the policy option is whether to 
treat foreign capital in the same way as a domestic capital (strengthening of regulations on 
foreign capital), or to bring the treatment of domestic capital in line with that of foreign capital 
(this means relaxation, and therefore, the overall schedule for capital account liberalization 
would become constraints). 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
      This paper tried to summarize the process of capital account liberalization by Japan from the 
period immediately after World War II to the 1990’s and to identify relevant points for China’s 
capital account liberalization.   
      The internal and external conditions that China faces today have, on the one hand, common 
elements with Japan in the 1960’s and 70’s (e.g. high economic growth, balance of payments 
surplus, increasing foreign-currency reserves, and upward pressure on the currency), and, on the 
other hand, different elements (e.g. worldwide trend toward capital accounts liberalization, and 
the increase in scale of cross-border capital flow). Additionally, although there are many 
similarities between two countries in the basic mechanisms of foreign exchange and capital 
controls (e.g. a principle of general prohibition, fundamental stance of encouraging capital 
inflow, and management through the banks), there are also differences (e.g. stance toward 
internationalization of the domestic currency and special treatment of foreign enterprises).   
   Compared to the 1960s and 70s, when Japan experienced a change in its foreign exchange 
rate system and a major revaluation of its currency, the size of the flow of cross-border capital 
and therefore, their potential impact is much greater now. On the other hand, the acceptance of 
capital controls by the international community is much lower. Thus in general, the environment 
                                                                            
50 According to newspaper reports, on March 10, 2004, Hong Kong authorities announced that 35 banks 
were handling Renminbi (Yuan) accounts with deposit balances greater than 2 billion Yuan. Additionally, 
the majority of the Renminbi accounts were converted from Hong Kong dollars, and of the new accounts 
opened at HSBC and others, roughly 75% were converted from Hong Kong dollars, with cash deposits at 
only about 25% (The Nikkei Financial Daily, 1 April 2004). 228  K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 
 
today is much less hospitable for China, which has to have, on its policy agenda, a practical 
change to their exchange rate management and the liberalization of capital accounts. 
Nevertheless, a great deal is at stake with the liberalization of capital accounts as was shown in 
the Asian crisis. From such a view point, this paper tried to draw implications to China based on 
Japan’s experiences as clearly as possible. 
      Major relevant points for China examined in this paper are as below. 
 
(1)  Considering relevant factors that China now faces such as the risk of huge capital 
movements, potential risk of capital reversals and lack of soundness of domestic financial 
sector, it seems appropriate for China to employ a gradual approach to the capital account 
liberalization as was employed by Japan in the past. 
(2)  In the formulation of a liberalization program, it seems to be important to liberalize those 
with the least risk first and those with greater risk late, to start with experimental 
liberalization, and then proceed to general liberalization, to flexibly revise the initial 
liberalization schedule in response to a change in circumstances, to retain emergency 
measures for the event of a crisis and to utilize the control mechanism through the banking 
system. 
(3)   However, as the effectiveness of regulations may have diminished and their long use may 
lead to a further reduction of their effectiveness, the time frame for China cannot be as long 
as decades as in the case of Japan and a substantially shortened period need to be considered 
for liberalization process. 
(4)  On the relationship between the change in the foreign exchange rate determination 
mechanism and liberalization of capital accounts, as capital accounts liberalization 
measures, no matter whether they are originally intended to promote inflows or outflows of 
capital, are bound to increase the amount of capital that can move in the event of a crisis, 
major liberalization measures of capital accounts should be considered only after impact on 
capital flows of a de facto change in the foreign exchange rate determination is examined. 
(5)  While liberalization of finance came after the liberalization of capital accounts in Japan, the 
move to a floating exchange rate regime alleviated pressures for cross boarder capital 
movements. By contrast, if the integration of domestic and international financial markets is 
implemented in China while maintaining a de facto fixed exchange rate system, the risk of 
abrupt and large capital flows between regulated domestic markets and liberalized 
international markets will be amplified. 
(6)  It is important to properly handle those Issues that are specific to China such as RMB 
deposit accounts by Hong Kong ID holders and different treatments between foreign and 
local capital. 
 
      As the China’s weight in the global economy is rapidly increasing, it is vitally important not   K. Aramaki / Public Policy Review 229 
 
only for China but also for Japan and the world economy that China will properly proceed 
without assuming excessive risk to the integration with global financial markets which is 
characterized by potential instability. As was shown in this paper, experiences of Japan of the 
decades ago with which present China seems to have a lot of factors in common can provide 
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